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VOLUME 82 FALL 2017 NUMBER 4 
 
 
The Hacking of Employment Law 




Employers can use software in ways that erode employment law, 
through noncompliance and avoidance.  The software exploits outdated 
regulations that do not anticipate the scale and precision with which 
employers can manage and manipulate the work relationship.  Conse-
quently, employers can implement systems that are largely consistent 
with existing laws but violate legal rules on the margin.  Employers can 
also use software to engage in lawful workaround tactics that avoid 
triggering some or all of the costs of complying with employment 
law.  However, such tactics can cause harm to workers beyond the loss 
of the specific workers’ rights or protections being avoided.  Avoidance 
can create new norms that can degrade wages and working conditions 
across the labor market.  Finally, when employers use software to avoid 
the employer-employee relationship entirely, employment law is weak-
ened as more workers operate in spaces beyond the law’s reach.  The 
result is an employment law regime where legal rules struggle to keep 
up with employers’ software-enabled innovations in noncompliance or 
are rendered irrelevant as employers innovate in spaces that regulation 
simply does not reach.  We conclude by suggesting ways that regulators 
can better adapt to workplaces where employers implement their deci-
sions and define the structure of work through software. 
 
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Robinson College of Business, Georgia State 
University; secondary appointment, Georgia State University College of Law.  Thanks 
to Cynthia Estlund, Ilana Gershon, Erik Girvan, Pauline Kim, Robert Mauro, Jamie 
Prenkert, Deborah Widiss, and participants in the Oregon Law Lab for exchanges that 
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Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral. – Melvin Kranzberg 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The workplace is increasingly mediated, governed, and constrained by 
software.1  Companies use software in hiring and making work assignments, 
setting workers’ schedules and tracking their hours, assessing performance, 
and managing payroll.  Software allows firms to automate and routinize man-
agement tasks, scale those operations across an entire workforce, and track, 
monitor, and mine data to make predictions and informed decisions.  In doing 
so, software holds the promise of increasing efficiency, decreasing waste, and 
even guarding against biases inherent in human judgment.2 
However, software’s gradual accession in the workplace is not all posi-
tive.  Using software, firms can implement systems that are largely consistent 
with existing laws but avoid or evade rules on the margin.  For example, time-
keeping programs can be set to “round” hourly employees’ timecards to the 
nearest quarter-hour.3  Though any given employee might lose only a few 
minutes per day, software’s ability to automate this function and apply it across 
an entire workforce can result in significant losses – and wage and hour law 
violations – in the aggregate.4  Software can also create information asymme-
tries.  Employees who lose pay as a result of rounding may not know about the 
software functionality or their lost wages, unless they keep meticulous parallel 
time records of their own (an unlikely assumption).  Moreover, even when an 
employee discovers the employer’s practices, outdated or ill-fitting regulations 
can provide employers with some measure of cover.  Software’s newness al-
lows employers to convince courts that they have engaged in something other 
than old-fashioned noncompliance.  As a result, employment law erodes. 
In other situations, firms use software lawfully to avoid, rather than vio-
late, legal rules.  Here, firms structure their relationship with workers to avoid 
triggering some or all of the costs of complying with employment law.  Such 
 
 1. Throughout this Article, we use the term “software,” which we define as the 
“set of programs, procedures, and related documentation associated with . . . a computer 
system.”  Software, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).  
Occasionally, we also refer to “code,” i.e., the language with which software is written; 
“algorithms,” or the rules that structure the way that software processes information 
and accomplishes tasks; “platforms,” or the virtual “spaces” that software creates 
through which people interact; and “apps,” which is another name for a software pro-
gram primarily developed for use on a mobile device.  
 2. Jennifer Taylor Arnold, Reining in Overtime Costs, HR MAGAZINE (Apr. 1, 
2009), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/Pages/0409tech.aspx (quot-
ing a representative from timekeeping company Kronos as saying, “An automated sys-
tem has a ‘standard application of rules, with no favoritism’”). 
 3. Timekeeping programs are discussed in greater detail in Part II, infra. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
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tactics can cause harm beyond the loss of the specific workers’ rights or pro-
tections being avoided.  In particular, software-enabled avoidance can create 
new norms that cause harms not contemplated by employment law as written. 
Scheduling software is a case in point.5  Employers use scheduling algo-
rithms to identify the employees whose hours are nearing some cost-triggering 
threshold – forty hours per week and the overtime entitlement, for instance.  
Those workers are sent home and replaced by others at the last minute.  Af-
fected workers lose overtime pay, but neither overtime pay nor any specific 
number of work hours is guaranteed by the law.  This avoidance strategy cre-
ates a new set of harms to the workers who are called in as replacements.  
Though these workers may appreciate extra hours, last-minute call-ins create 
significant instability, requiring workers to find dependent care on a moment’s 
notice, disrupting family routines, and interfering with workers’ ability to at-
tend school or hold a second job.  In addition, employers sometimes demand 
that employees remain available for unexpected call-ins.  If they refuse, em-
ployers deny them access to future shifts.  Employers’ use of software to reduce 
overtime costs thus creates a new norm in which workers’ schedules are unsta-
ble and unpredictable, but the harm that results is beyond the reach of employ-
ment law. 
Finally, firms can use software in ways that mix noncompliance and 
avoidance.  Here again, outdated or ill-fitting regulations allow firms to test the 
line between breaking the law and merely side-stepping it.  The use of work 
distribution platforms by “gig” firms, such as ride-sharing company Uber, of-
fers an example.6  Uber uses its app to connect drivers with customers.  The 
company classifies these drivers as independent contractors and disclaims any 
employer-employee relationship.7  Indeed, the rules that distinguish employees 
 
 5. Scheduling software is discussed in greater detail in Part III, infra. 
 6. The terms “work distribution platform” and “work intermediation platform” 
come from Ilana Gershon & Melissa Cefkin, Click for Work: Rethinking Work, Re-
thinking Labor Through Online Work Distribution Platforms (Feb. 2017) (unpublished 
working paper) (on file with authors).  Work distribution platforms are discussed in 
greater detail in Part V, infra.  The terms “gig economy” and “gig firm” refer to com-
panies and market sectors in which workers engage in short-term work arrangements 
with employers that are often mediated by digital technology and where workers are 
often characterized as independent contractors rather than employees.  See generally 
Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Labor and Employment Law, 51 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 51 (2017).  “Gig firms” are those that rely heavily on such short-term workers; 
the “gig economy” refers to the growing market share of such firms across various 
industries and sectors.  See id. at 51. 
 7. See Start Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/ (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2017) (“Once you’re approved to drive with Uber as an independent contrac-
tor, we’ll provide everything you need to be a success on the road.”); Johana Bhuiyan, 
Uber’s Class-Action Settlement with Drivers Means Almost Nothing Is Changing, 
RECODE (Apr. 25, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://www.recode.net/2016/4/25/11586386/uber-
driver-tips-settlement. 
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from independent contractors assume the existence of some human who con-
trols aspects of the work relationship.8  Once the human intermediary is re-
placed by an app, the analysis becomes more difficult.  In this way, firms like 
Uber use software to engage in a form of regulatory arbitrage,9 claiming inde-
pendent contractor status for their workers and opting out of employment law 
coverage.  Consequently, more workers operate in spaces beyond the law’s 
reach, and employment rights are left only to the privileged few who are able 
to claim employee status. 
In using software to avoid and violate employment laws, employers ac-
complish a regulatory hack.  We use the term “hack” in two senses.  The term’s 
technical definition is to “gain access to a computer illegally.”10  It can also 
mean something closer to a “workaround,” i.e., “a clever solution to a tricky 
problem.”11  The latter usage connotes ingenuity (in the eyes of the hacker, at 
least) but not necessarily law-breaking; the former explicitly contemplates vi-
olating legal rules.  We use the term “regulatory hack”12 to refer to unlawful 
noncompliance, lawful avoidance strategies, and conduct that falls somewhere 
in between.  The hacked target is not a computer but the system of laws that 
regulate the work relationship.  Software makes it possible. 
We explore regulatory hacks through four case studies: timekeeping pro-
grams, screening and selection algorithms, scheduling software, and work dis-
tribution platforms.  In each instance, we identify the harms that software can 
 
 8. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When 
It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 314 
(2001) (tracing the history of the control-based test for employee status and noting that 
all versions of the test “have control and domination as their central concern; the former 
purporting to focus on control over the worker’s performance of services for the em-
ployer as a matter of contractual right, and the latter purporting to look at an employer’s 
sources of power that give it true, if not contractually specified, control”). 
 9. The concept of regulatory arbitrage is discussed further in Part I.A, infra. 
 10. Hack, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).  For 
an example of this usage, see Robby Mook, Opinion, Russia’s D.N.C. Hack Was Only 
the Start, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/opin-
ion/russias-dnc-hack-was-only-the-start.html (exploring alternative uses of the term 
“hack” and defining the break-in to the Democratic National Committee’s servers at-
tributed to Russia as “an attack with stolen information”). 
 11. Hack, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/de-
fine.php?term=hack (last visited Dec. 18, 2017); What Does the Use of “Hack” in Eve-
ryday, Non-Programming Contexts Mean?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/Slang-
What-does-the-use-of-hack-in-everyday-non-programming-contexts-mean (last vis-
ited Dec. 18, 2017) (“[Y]ou can get an idea that a hack is a procedure or a way of doing 
something that: 1. Demonstrates cleverness or ingenuity[;] 2. Solves a meaningful prob-
lem[;] 3. Is not a common or well-known solution to the problem[;] 4. May not be the 
most straightforward or appropriate solution.”). 
 12. As Part II, infra, explains, we have adopted the concept of a regulatory hack 
and the specific “regulatory hack” terminology from a variety of previous sources.  This 
article builds on and extends those prior uses. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/5
2017] THE HACKING OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 977 
cause and examine whether the software enables noncompliance, lawful avoid-
ance, or some combination.  We then consider the implications of these hacks 
for employment law as a whole and offer some possible regulatory responses. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II defines the term “regulatory 
hack” in more detail and tracks the development of the concept and terminol-
ogy in the work of earlier scholars and writers.  Parts III through VI present the 
four case studies, and Part VII turns to possible regulatory responses. 
II.  “REGULATORY HACK” DEFINED 
This Part traces the origins of the “regulatory hack” concept and term in 
cyberlaw, copyright, and employment law scholarship. 
A.  Roots in Cyberlaw and Copyright Scholarship 
Software-enabled noncompliance and avoidance have been a central fo-
cus of cyberlaw and copyright scholarship for many years.  Drawing upon cop-
yright controversies over peer-to-peer file sharing and the rapid expansion of 
the internet in the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars focused considerable 
energy on the relationship between software and law.13  From this well-devel-
oped literature, we find Tim Wu’s theoretical framework most instructive.  In 
a 2003 article, When Code Isn’t Law, Wu describes three ways in which soft-
ware can erode, challenge, or alter legal rules: evasion, “avoision,” and 
change.14 
Evasion, according to Wu, consists of strategies to “decreas[e] the odds 
of being punished for violating a law,” such as a bank robber’s wearing a mask 
 
 13. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6–8 
(1999); Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 707–09 (2003); R. An-
thony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Struc-
ture of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 631–32 (2003); R. Polk 
Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL L. REV. 457 (2005); Pamela Samuelson, 
Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 177, 
187–190 (2006); Bennet Lincoff, Common Sense, Accommodation and Sound Policy 
for the Digital Music Marketplace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1 (2008); Annemarie 
Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade After Napster, 
40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 573–74 (2009); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube, UGC, and 
Digital Music: Competing Business and Cultural Models in the Internet Age, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 431 (2010). 
 14. Wu, supra note 13, at 682 (describing code as “an anti-regulatory mechanism: 
a tool to minimize the costs of law that certain groups will use to their advantage”).  
Though Wu articulated the differences among these three responses to regulation, the 
bulk of his analysis then collapsed the first two – evasion and avoision – and examined 
peer-to-peer sharing software as an instance of copyright law “avoidance,” as con-
trasted with “change” behavior.  See id. at 692–99. 
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to disguise his or her identity.15  Wu views software as enabling both the un-
derlying legal violation and measures to evade detection.16  “[L]aw-busting 
code,” in the file sharing context, allowed millions of users to trade digital mu-
sic files freely, without regard for copyright limitations.17  By creating the con-
ditions for noncompliance on such a large scale, software allowed everyday 
people to violate copyright law, giving “cover” to end users whose very num-
ber would seem to lower the odds of detection and punishment.18 
The term “avoision,” which Wu borrows from Leo Katz and Ronald 
Turner, refers to “the avoidance of laws in ways that evade the law’s intent or 
purpose but do not actually constitute unlawful behavior.”19  Avoidance can 
also be characterized as regulatory arbitrage, a term that originally referred to 
multinational companies’ forum shopping in search of countries with the most 
favorable tax rates and regulatory environment.20  Regulatory arbitrage has 
been used to describe many forms of legal avoidance and gamesmanship – both 
domestic and cross-national – such as workarounds “to avoid taxes, accounting 
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs.”21  Avoidance tactics 
 
 15. Id. at 692. 
 16. Id. at 682. 
 17. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. Id. at 682, 692 (citing LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, 
FRAUD AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 17–30 (1996); Ronald Turner, Reactions of 
the Regulated: A Federal Labor Law Example, 17 LAB. LAW. 479 (2002)).  Katz and 
Turner’s work, in turn, echoes that of sociologist Doreen McBarnet, who has described 
firms’ creation of “strategies for weakening the law by legally avoiding it.”   Doreen 
D. McBarnet, Law, Policy, and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively Implement Egal-
itarian Policies?, 15 J.L. & SOC’Y 113, 114 (1988) (“Regulation is not so much linger-
ing behind business practice as a major motivation for its change.  Business adapts to 
law not necessarily by complying with its aims, but by changing to keep outside its 
ambit.  Those allegedly subject to the law can turn the law upon itself and render it 
ineffective.”); see also Charlotte S. Alexander, Legal Avoidance and the Restructuring 
of Work, in 47 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS, THE STRUCTURING 
OF WORK IN ORGANIZATIONS (Lisa E. Cohen, M. Diane Burton, & Michael Lounsbury 
eds., 2016). 
 20. See, e.g., Atul K. Shah, The Dynamics of International Bank Regulation, 4 J. 
FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 371, 371 (1996) (noting that “regulatory endeavours have 
become enmeshed in international economic competition, and sophisticated regulatory 
arbitrage is being conducted on a global playing field.  Thus, regulatory objectives and 
standards are being increasingly compromised or subverted”). 
 21. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).  Leo 
Katz offers an even more generalized version of this principle in his theory of “avoi-
sion”: the myriad ways in which individuals and corporations game a system to their 
advantage.  See KATZ, supra note 19, at 103–04.  Katz and Fleischer argue that avoid-
ance is an inevitable side effect of rules and that any rule that privileges form over 
substance allows that form to be manipulated to avoid the rule.  Id. at 10; Fleischer, 
supra, at 244 (identifying three conditions for regulatory arbitrage: where “the same 
transaction receives different regulatory treatment under different regulatory regimes,” 
where “two transactions with identical cash flows receive different regulatory treatment 
6
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almost always involve behavior that is technically legal, but that “exploit[s] the 
differences between a law’s goals and its self defined limits.”22  Thus, as Wu 
points out, peer-to-peer file sharing software was designed in a decentralized 
way to avoid vicarious liability for software companies as intermediaries under 
the copyright regime.23 
Change, finally, comprises direct efforts by regulated entities to alter legal 
rules to their benefit.24  This could consist of lobbying, “a tool that delivers . . 
.  legal change for a price.”25  Change can also come about via litigation, by 
which “interest groups determine or radically influence the regulatory agendas 
of agencies.”26 
In Wu’s view, the three options are interrelated and can act as substitutes 
for one another.  Regulated entities might choose to invest time and resources 
in evasion or avoision, rather than direct change efforts.  In other words, when 
the law generates compliance costs, regulated entities may try to change the 
rules through the front door (presumably while continuing to comply), use soft-
ware to violate the law through the back door, or opt out of the law’s require-
ments entirely. 
Further, in what Wu calls a “reaction to the reaction,”27 regulatory change 
might occur as a result of widespread evasion or avoision, as the law loses its 
grip on the behavior of regulated entities.  Such change could cut in either di-
rection: regulation could be loosened, consistent with the interests of the regu-
lated, or it could be revised and tightened, in the interests of the regulators, to 
“restore the balance” that existed pre-evasion or avoision.28 
B.  Renewed Attention with the Rise of the Gig Economy 
The problem of legal avoidance has long been a concern for employment 
law scholars.29  Miriam Cherry, for example, has written extensively on the 
legal dilemmas associated with virtual work.30  Recently, the rise of the “gig 
 
under the same regulatory regime,” and where “the same transaction receives different 
regulatory treatment in the future than it does today”). 
 22. Wu, supra note 13, at 692. 
 23. Id. at 729–30. 
 24. Id. at 693–95. 
 25. Id. at 694. 
 26. Id. at 695. 
 27. Id. at 709. 
 28. Id. at 705. 
 29. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor 
Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996); 
Carlson, supra note 8, at 298; Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical 
Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without 
Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257–58 (2006). 
 30. Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077 (2009); Miriam A. Cherry, 
7
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economy” has captured the attention of employment law scholars31 in the same 
way that file sharing software previously mobilized copyright scholars. 
This body of scholarship focuses primarily on the challenges to employ-
ment law when the business model of the “gig economy” diverges from (or 
appears to diverge from) traditional models of employment.32  In doing so, 
commentators also examine the extent to which the “gig economy” lies beyond 
the reach of existing laws33 and changes that may (or may not)34 be necessary 
to protect workers.  Technology plays a central role in this story and has been 
characterized as the driving force behind its growth,35 a dehumanizing mecha-
nism,36 and a substitute for management.37 
 
A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011) [hereinafter Cherry, A Taxon-
omy of Virtual Work]; Miriam A. Cherry, Cyber Commodification, 72 MD. L. REV. 381 
(2013); Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of 
Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016) [hereinafter Cherry, Beyond Misclassi-
fication]. 
 31. See, e.g., Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30; Valerio De 
Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-In-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, 
and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471 (2016); 
Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); Elizabeth Tippett, 
Using Contract Terms to Detect Underlying Litigation Risk: An Initial Proof of Con-
cept, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 549 (2016); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Am-
azon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673 
(2016); Paul M. Secunda, Uber Retirement, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2017) 
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894566); Benjamin 
Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 
(2016); Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Pol-
icy Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, 37 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y J. 543 (2016); 
Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479 (2016); Noah D. Zatz, The Piper Lecture, Does Work 
Have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1081 (2016). 
 32. Tippett, supra note 31, at 586–91 (study finding substantial variance in esti-
mated litigation risk for sharing companies); Lobel, supra note 31, at 92. 
 33. Zatz, supra note 31, at 1086 (making a broader argument that “current [legal] 
structures” exclude a number of categories of individuals that should properly be 
viewed as “workers”); Lobel, supra note 31, at 93 (stating that “the regulatory chal-
lenges are divisible into easy and hard cases”). 
 34. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 31, at 1707 (proposing a modified control 
test); Means & Seiner, supra note 31, at 1535 (arguing that the test should focus on 
“how much flexibility . . . the individual ha[s] in the working relationship”); Rogers, 
supra note 31, at 499 (suggesting that the concept of employment is analogous to the 
“concept of duty in tort”). 
 35. See Lobel, supra note 31, at 100–01. 
 36. De Stefano, supra note 31, at 477–78 (“[H]umans-as-a-service . . . . [are] ex-
pected to run as flawlessly and smoothly as a software or technological tool . . . .”); 
Gerald F. Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation? Uberization and the 
Web Page Enterprise, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 501, 512 (2016) (“[T]he task may be 
replacing the job.”). 
 37. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 596 (“[A] new trend is that 
algorithms are absorbing many organizational functions that managers traditionally 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/5
2017] THE HACKING OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 981 
Of particular note for our purposes, Orly Lobel and Noah Zatz identify 
the gig economy as a form of regulatory arbitrage38 – a concept that we explore 
more broadly in this Article as an avoidance mechanism.  Several commenta-
tors also place the gig economy within larger trends toward the casualization 
of work – where “precarious workers” are limited to part-time and temporary 
work that is “uncertain, unpredictable, and risky.”39 
Indeed, the term “regulatory hack,” which we adopt in this Article, origi-
nated from commentary on the gig economy.40  In a 2011 article, journalist 
Matt Yglesias first used the word “hack” to describe software’s role in facili-
tating regulatory avoidance.41  He observed that gig economy companies pri-
marily derive their competitive advantage from the lawful avoidance of 
“dumb” legal rules: 
It’s an extremely elegant use of technology to, in effect, hack the legal 
system.  Through the magic of computer power, a sedan becomes a cab 
without changing its technical legal status. . . .   
To be clear, I’m not accusing Uber of doing anything illegal.  What 
they are doing, however, is running a business that would have bleak 
prospects of success if our nation’s taxi laws were not so dumb.  One of 
 
would perform.  Computer code may perform a variety of supervisory tasks from the 
mundane to the sophisticated: assigning tasks to workers, speeding up work processes, 
determining the timing and length of breaks, monitoring quality, ranking employee, and 
more.”). 
 38. Lobel, supra note 31, at 92 (examining “whether digital disruptions comprise 
loopholes akin to regulatory arbitrage . . . [or] circumvention akin to controversial cop-
yright protection reforms”); Zatz, supra note 31, at 1093; see also Cunningham-Parme-
ter, supra note 31, at 1691 (“[B]y tapping into their unique ability to skirt employment 
mandates, intermediaries can maximize savings for the firms that engage them.”); 
Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 579 (“[W]e are currently experi-
encing a far-reaching digital transformation of work.  The changes include the growth 
of automatic management and a move toward ever more precarious work.”). 
 39. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 598 (discussing founda-
tional work by Arne Kalleberg on precarious work); see Lobel, supra note 31, at 131 
(“The rise of the contingent workforce precedes the rise of the platform.”); De Stefano, 
supra note 31, at 480–81; GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS 
CLASS 24–26 (2011); cf. Matthew W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in 
Historical Perspective, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 603 (2016) (describing the history 
of work performed away from the employer’s premises). 




 41. See id. 
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Uber’s stronger markets, for example, is Boston, a city that features ex-
orbitant fares and low taxi availability in part because Cambridge cabs 
can’t pick up passengers in Boston and vice versa.42 
 
Investor Chris Dixon then used the phrase “regulatory hack” in a blog post in 
2012.43  Unlike Yglesias’s avoidance-centered analysis, Dixon viewed soft-
ware primarily as a means for noncompliance.44  And like Wu’s conception of 
evasion as an alternative to direct change efforts, Dixon argued that startups 
use software to violate the law instead of lobbying for new legal rules.45  In 
Dixon’s view, when startups demonstrate the economic value of a business 
model that is based on noncompliance, “[w]ith luck, regulators are forced to 
follow.”46 
In this Article, we seek to broaden the frame beyond the gig economy and 
assess how software may erode employment law in additional ways.  In other 
words, we apply Wu’s typology to consider other employment law “hacks.”  
This broad frame is important, as a narrow focus on the gig economy misses a 
larger shift, one in which the work relationship – in gig- and non-gig jobs alike 
– has come to be mediated, governed, and constrained by software.  The fol-
lowing Parts examine four examples: timekeeping programs, screening and se-
lection algorithms, scheduling software, and work distribution platforms. 
 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
 43. Chris Dixon, Regulatory Hacks, CDIXON BLOG (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://cdixon.org/2012/10/10/regulatory-hacks/.  Dixon’s usage is not limited to soft-
ware: he is also referring to certain types of business models that challenge legal rules.  
See id.  Dixon uses the example of a cellular phone company that ignored then federal 
rules permitting only two cellular systems to operate in a city.  Id.  Another example of 
Dixon’s usage might be Tesla’s refusal to abide by dealership laws.  Tesla’s cars are 
full of software, but Tesla does not use the software to avoid dealership rules.  It avoids 
dealership rules by opening storefronts in the same way that any car manufacturer could 
avoid dealerships by opening storefronts directly under the control of the manufacturer.  
See Elon Musk, The Tesla Approach to Distributing and Servicing Cars, TESLA (Oct. 
22, 2012), https://www.tesla.com/blog/tesla-approach-distributing-and-servicing-cars.  
Since Dixon’s first usage, journalists and bloggers have used the term in varying ways, 
sometimes appearing to refer to noncompliance and sometimes to avoidance.  See, e.g., 
Kevin Drum, The Gig Economy Is Mostly a Myth, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 19, 2016, 5:05 
PM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/04/gig-economy-mostly-myth; 
a16z Podcast: The Art of the Regulatory Hack, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (May 16, 2016) 
(available at http://a16z.com/2016/05/16/regulatory-hacking/) (using the term in a way 
more consistent with Dixon’s phrase, where startups “directly confron[t],” instead of 
stealthily bypassing, regulatory barriers and incumbent-driven regulatory capture chal-
lenges). 
 44. Compare Yglesias, supra note 40, with Dixon, supra note 43. 
 45. See Wu, supra note 13, at 692; Dixon, supra note 43. 
 46. Dixon, supra note 43. 
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III.  TIMEKEEPING PROGRAMS 
In a recent law review article, When Timekeeping Software Undermines 
Compliance,47 we examined how software used to record employee hours can 
facilitate and legitimize non-compliance with wage and hour law.  Many em-
ployers track workers’ hours electronically – via computer log-ins, swipe cards, 
RFID badges,48 or even iris or fingerprint scans – and use software to handle 
the recorded hours before they are forwarded to payroll.49  As we explained in 
that article, the software offers a number of features to modify employee time-
cards, some of which are automatic (like “rounding” and “automatic break de-
ductions”) and others of which are discretionary (buttons for supervisors to 
“edit” a subordinate’s timecard).50 
While that article was focused on the behavioral cues presented by spe-
cific software features, our focus here is on the attributes of software generally 
that can ultimately violate legal rules.  To illustrate, we describe two timekeep-
ing software functionalities that erode compliance: rounding – described 
briefly in the Introduction – and automatic break deductions.  For each, we 
examine how the availability of automatic, scalable functionality combines 
with outdated regulations to erode compliance on the margin.51  Compounding 
the problem, the software tends to obscure violations by the employer, often 
due to information asymmetries.52 
 
 47. Elizabeth Tippett, Charlotte S. Alexander & Zev J. Eigen, When Timekeeping 
Software Undermines Compliance, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2017). 
 48. The term “RFID” refers to “radio-frequency identification.”  They are elec-
tronic tags that can convey information to a sensor.  Radio-Frequency Identification, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2017). 
 49. Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 2–3. 
 50. Id. at 18–19, 34–38. 
 51. From a big picture standpoint, timekeeping software inarguably promotes 
compliance over manual or quasi-manual forms of timekeeping.  Part of this compli-
ance function occurs by automating decisions that were previously vulnerable to human 
error.  Transcription errors or calculation errors are less likely under a software-based 
system.  Employees no longer have to worry about a paycheck delivered late because 
the payroll manager is behind schedule or out sick.  Timekeeping software also assures 
a baseline level of compliance.  The most blatant wage and hour violations can occur 
when employers keep no records at all of hours worked by employees.  As long as the 
employer collects hours data through the software and applies whatever default settings 
come with the software, employees have some assurance they will more or less be paid 
what they are owed.  Timekeeping software that is set up to pay employees only for 
half of the days they have worked will not gain much market share.  Noncompliance 
would be readily detected by workers.  The liability it would impose on employers 
would be intolerably high.  Instead, timekeeping software exploits ambiguity to erode 
compliance at the margins, as we describe below. 
 52. Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 39–40. 
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A.  Exploitation of Automatic, Scalable Functionality 
A software feature known as “rounding” exemplifies the ways in which 
scalable functionality can systematically disadvantage workers.53  Rounding 
allows employers to set the system to automatically alter an employee’s time 
punch to a pre-specified increment of time.54  One common unit of rounding is 
7.5 minutes, such that all time punches appear in quarter-hour increments (on 
the hour, fifteen minutes past the hour, thirty minutes, forty-five minutes).55  
Suppose, for example, that an employee logged in and began work at 8:55 a.m., 
five minutes before the formal start of her shift.  The software would “round” 
the employee’s punch forward to 9:00, and pay her based on a 9:00 start time, 
causing her to lose five minutes of pay.56  At the end of the shift, punching out 
at five minutes past the hour would result in losing those minutes of pay as 
well.57 
In theory, rounding does not disadvantage employees if we assume that 
employee punches are distributed equally before and after the quarter hour.  
However, this assumption may depart substantially from employee practice.  
Consider, for example, a typical employer attendance policy.  The policy likely 
provides for discipline of employees who arrive late or leave early.58  Conse-
quently, employees are unlikely to collect “bonus” minutes available under the 
rounding system by cutting their shifts short.59  Moreover, if the employer en-
forces the attendance policy strictly, requiring that an employee be at his or her 
station and logged in no later than the exact start of a shift, the likelihood of an 
early punch increases.60 
When rounding is combined with employer attendance policies, the re-
sulting distribution of punches can favor the employer in the aggregate, even 
if any given employee sometimes benefits individually or a subset of employ-
ees benefit over time.61  Rounding exploits the scalability and automaticity of 
 
 53. Id. at 37–40. 
 54. Id. at 37. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Conversely, if the employee arrived five minutes late, the clock would “round” 
back to 9:00 a.m., and the employee would receive pay for five extra minutes. 
 57. As in the previous note, leaving early would produce a bonus for the employee, 
where the clock rounds forward. 
 58. Notwithstanding the attendance policy, it would still be theoretically possible 
for employees to benefit from a rounding system if they log in sufficiently early for an 
early punch to be rounded back even earlier.  For example, an employee who logs in at 
8:50 a.m. for a 9:00 a.m. shift would be rounded back to 8:45, providing the employee 
with a five-minute bonus.  However, employers can defeat this strategy by prohibiting 
employees from logging in more than a certain number of minutes early (for example, 
seven minutes).  They can do so either through a written policy or by setting the soft-
ware to reject early logins. 
 59. Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 37–40. 
 60. See id. at 39. 
 61. Id. at 38–39. 
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software.  Implemented through a single click, the employer’s advantage arises 
less from the individual application of the rule than its aggregate effect.  It 
operates as a form of casino odds,62 betting that the employer will receive a 
favorable outcome in the aggregate, rather than a sure win in each case.  Failing 
to pay hourly employees for each hour worked can violate state wage and hour 
laws.63  When lost time causes an employee’s pay to dip below the hourly min-
imum wage, or results in unpaid overtime, this practice can also violate the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).64 
Another common feature of timekeeping software – known as “automatic 
break deductions” – offers a different mechanism for employers to reclaim em-
ployee wages over time.65  This feature allows the employer to deduct unpaid 
meal or rest periods from an employee’s hours automatically.66  Automatic 
break deductions operate as a favorable default setting for the employer.67  
Consider, for example, a retail or food service worker scheduled to take a half-
hour unpaid meal break, who is called back early or misses the break entirely 
 
 62. Id. at 40. 
 63. Id. at 11–12. 
 64. The FLSA requires that employees receive an average of at least $7.25 per 
hour and 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for hours worked over forty in a workweek.  
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2012).  Some states have 
higher minimum wage requirements.  Minimum Wage Laws in the States – September 
30, 2017, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 19, 2017).  If an employee is paid at or near the relevant hourly minimum 
wage, then the loss of time due to automatic rounding means that his or her pay, when 
averaged across his or her actual hours worked, would dip below the required hourly 
minimum.  Likewise, if an employee’s actual hours worked, prior to automatic round-
ing, exceed forty hours per week, then he or she is due overtime.  When rounding arti-
ficially brings those hours below forty, an overtime violation occurs. 
 65. Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 34–36. 
 66. Id. at 34. 
 67. Id. at 35–36.  For this reason, automatic break deductions can be expected to 
be appealing even for employers without a legitimate need to avoid frequent punches.  
For example, employees working in call centers can have their break time tracked with 
reasonable precision based on logins and logouts from the call center software.  Em-
ployees who take breaks away from their physical workstation can easily be logged in 
and out as they leave and return to the work area using their RFID tag.  A driver’s 
breaks (or a missed break) can be detected through GPS measures of a vehicle’s move-
ment.  Where break time is more accurately detected through reliable proxies, auto-
matic break deductions, like rounding, serve only to make time records more inaccu-
rate, without a legitimate business justification.  Automatic break deductions can also 
be applied in workplaces where hourly workers punch in and out for meal and rest 
breaks.  In these situations, where the punch data indicates a missed break, the software 
will presume that the employee took the break but forgot to punch in and out (rather 
than assume that the break was missed entirely).  Likewise, if the punch data is asym-
metrical – where an employee only punches in from a break, or only punches out – the 
software can also infer the standard break time from that punch. 
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when business picks up.  Unless the employee (or the supervisor) takes affirm-
ative action to override the deduction, the software will deduct the break time 
from the employee’s pay. 
Moreover, employees may not have the ability or authority to override 
deductions themselves.68  Because federal wage and hour law does not require 
employers to provide employees with access to their own timecards,69 employ-
ees may depend on others to override the deduction for them.  The employer’s 
policy may require them to record the missed break in a paper logbook or 
form.70  Or, it may require them to ask their supervisor to override the deduc-
tion.71  Any breakdown in the implementation of this procedure inures to the 
employer’s benefit.  If the employee forgets to ask for the override, or is too 
afraid or uninformed to do so, the employer benefits.  If the supervisor forgets 
or refuses to input the override, the employer benefits.  If the paperwork is 
misplaced, the employer benefits as well.72  And as above, the employee’s lost 
hours can constitute a violation of minimum wage law, overtime law, or both.73 
Our purpose here is not to make an empirical claim about the frequency 
of missed breaks or the frequency with which missed breaks are overridden.  
Depending on the circumstances, missed breaks may be rare, or missed over-
rides may be the exception rather than the rule.  Such occurrences need not be 
common to erode compliance at the margins, however.  Instead, like rounding, 
automatic break deductions favor the employer in small increments, which add 
up when aggregated over large numbers of employees and/or long periods of 
time. 
 
 68. See Elizabeth Tippett, How Employers Profit from Electronic Wage Theft Un-
der the FLSA, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 37–38) (on file with 
authors). 
 69. See Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 39–40, 46. 
 70. See, e.g., Tippett, supra note 68, at 42; Berger v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 
1:05 CV 1508, 2007 WL 2902907, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2007). 
 71. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham, Campus Kronos Quick Guide: 30 Mi-
nute Auto-Deduct Lunch Rule, http://www.uab.edu/images/fi-
nance/vpad/pdf/KRONOS/Autodeductlunchrulequickguide.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017) (explaining that supervisors have the authority to override the automatic deduc-
tion); TOWN OF BETHLEHEM, EMPLOYEE POLICY HANDBOOK 13, http://www.townof-
bethlehem.org/DocumentCenter/View/3983 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (“Managers 
will handle canceling automatic lunch deduction if it happens.”). 
 72. Of course, one might imagine a scenario in which employees manipulate the 
automatic break deductions to their advantage – taking extra minutes on every break at 
every opportunity.  Because the software assumes a standard break time, these strategic 
employees receive pay for work they did not perform.  But like employees attempting 
to game the rounding policy, they would do so at the risk of discipline by their super-
visor for violating rules regarding break duration.  Over time, those employees would 
be disciplined or terminated, while the remaining conscientious employees are more 
likely to be disadvantaged by the automatic breaks. 
 73. See supra note 51. 
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B.  Exploitation of Information Asymmetries 
Compounding the problems of scalability and automaticity, timekeeping 
software’s operation is opaque to employees, hiding the aggregate effects of 
rounding and automatic break deductions.  Only the employer has access to the 
underlying punch data, and only the employer knows which automatic software 
settings have been enabled.  This produces an information asymmetry that im-
pedes detection by affected workers who might otherwise challenge the prac-
tice.74  Because wage and hour rules rely heavily on private enforcement, in-
formation asymmetries ultimately reduce the employer’s incentive to comply 
with the underlying rule.75 
Rounding rules rely heavily on information asymmetries to avoid detec-
tion.76  Timekeeping software routinely stores the original punch information, 
in addition to the data that is generated after rounding is applied.77  Thus, the 
employer has the option of reviewing the difference between actual and 
rounded punches to assess whether it benefits or loses from the rule.  (On the 
other hand, employers may prefer to avoid the information to escape later ar-
guments that wage and hour violations were willful.78) 
Suppose an employer discovers it is disadvantaged by the rounding rule.  
It can cut its losses by removing or adjusting software settings.  If instead the 
employer discovers that it benefits from rounding, a litigation-averse employer 
might discontinue the practice, but others may leave it in place and continue to 
pocket the benefits.79  Either way, an employer is unlikely to pay back the ag-
 
 74. Tippett, supra note 68, at 28–29 (describing the difficulty plaintiffs experience 
in identifying the type of wage and hour violation without access to the employer’s 
timekeeping settings). 
 75. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforce-
ment: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070–71 (2014) (“Workplace rights in 
the United States are generally enforced from the bottom up.  With few exceptions, 
labor and employment laws contain private rights of action that enable workers them-
selves to bring lawsuits when their rights are violated.  These private lawsuits vastly 
outnumber government enforcement actions against law-breaking employers.  Even 
what seems to be top-down government enforcement is often bottom-up enforcement 
in disguise, as government agencies depend in large part on worker complaints to direct 
their enforcement activity.  Workplace law enforcement therefore depends significantly 
on worker ‘voice,’ with workers themselves identifying violations of their rights and 
making claims to enforce them.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 76. See Zev Eigen, Professor, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, NYU 66thAnnual 
Conference on Labor: Reforming the FLSA (June 6, 2013). 
 77. See Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 19. 
 78. A finding of willfulness under the FLSA can make the employer liable for 
liquidated damages equal to the underlying wage and hour violation and a longer statute 
of limitations.  See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). 
 79. Rounding can be quite profitable for employers, even after litigation and set-
tlement costs are taken into consideration.  See Tippett, supra note 68, at 29. 
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gregate loss to employees generated by a rounding rule, which could tip em-
ployees off to the possible wage and hour violation and give rise to litigation 
risk at a potentially workforce-wide scale. 
Employees, for their part, have no ability to assess whether they have been 
disadvantaged by the rule.80  They would have to keep a personal record of 
their actual time punches, calculate their hours, and then (assuming no other 
changes have been made to their paychecks) compare their estimated 
paychecks to their actual pay.  Employees also have no access to timestamps 
for other employees, so they cannot assess the aggregate effect of the rule on 
other workers.81  Consequently, a plaintiffs’ lawyer seeking to represent a class 
of employees must guess whether a putative class representative has been in-
dividually harmed and the amount the class has lost overall.  From an informa-
tional standpoint, individual employees are working from a manual, pen-and-
paper system and fare poorly against the big data available to employers. 
Automatic break deductions also place employees at an informational dis-
advantage.  Unlike rounding, employers may not have the original punch data 
from breaks (if employees do not punch in and out for each break).82  Never-
theless, automatic breaks produce other information asymmetries.  The first 
asymmetry arises from the structure of the break deduction.  If the employer 
implements a simple form of break deduction – for example, automatically de-
ducting an unpaid thirty-minute meal break each day – it is likely that the em-
ployee is aware of this practice, and no asymmetry exists. 
But in reality, software break rules can be highly complex.  One univer-
sity, for example, has implemented a break rule that consists of several differ-
ent automatic calculations that vary depending upon whether the employee has 
punched in and out for the break and the duration of the recorded break.83  The 
rule functions essentially as a series of “if, then” contingencies, implemented 
by software.84  Where the employer has no duty to disclose the fact or nature 
of the automatic break deduction, the employee is not well-positioned to iden-
tify when the actual circumstances diverge from the assumptions underlying 
 
 80. Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 39–40. 
 81. In fact, some employer policies prohibit employees from discussing their pay 
at all.  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: PAY SECRECY (2014), 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/media/pay_secrecy.pdf (reporting that “nearly half of all 
workers nationally reported that they were either contractually forbidden or strongly 
discouraged from discussing their pay with their colleagues”). 
 82. See Tippett, supra note 68, at 36 (study of automatic break deduction cases; 
employers tended not to have punch records of break time). 
 83. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham, supra note 71. 
 84. See id. (applying automatic break deduction if employees worked 8.5 or more 
hours with no lunch punches, or with incomplete punches, but no deduction if employ-
ees punched in and out for lunch or worked fewer than 8.25 hours).  An automatic break 
deduction system adopted by fast food chain Jack in the Box, for instance, was so com-
plex it is difficult to summarize.  See Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10–cv–
960–ST, 2013 WL 1326563, at *8–10 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013). 
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the rule.  And employees are in no position to request an override to rules when 
they do not know or fully understand the rules’ structure or effect. 
Employers also benefit from differential access to individual timecards 
among employees.  Employees may not have access to their own time cards or 
to the credentials to override an automatic break deduction.  Absent that access 
– or notification of an override – employees are left to guess whether they were 
fully compensated for their time.85 
C.  Exploitation of Outdated and Ill-Fitting Legal Rules 
Both rounding and automatic break deductions are made possible by out-
dated legal rules, which do not expressly prohibit either practice.  When em-
ployees challenge employers’ timekeeping systems, courts engage in an inten-
sive fact-based inquiry.86  This allows employers to credibly claim that they 
were not willfully or intentionally depriving employees of wages.  This gap 
between regulations and software-enabled employment practices allows em-
ployers to claim some measure of “cover” for their noncompliance. 
Federal regulations dating back to 1961 authorize rounding provided that 
it “will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees 
properly for all the time they have actually worked.”87  The rule represents a 
vestigial legal accommodation to employers previously burdened with pen-
and-paper calculations.  There is, of course, no technological need for rounding 
within timekeeping software today – the software can record and calculate 
hours to the millisecond.88  Instead, software makers offer rounding function-
ality to suit employer preferences for what might be euphemistically termed 
“predictable” labor costs. 
When reviewing workplace rounding rules, courts require that employers 
do not systematically disadvantage employees over time.89  The lawfulness of 
the employer’s policy thus turns on a question of fact.  Consider an employer’s 
decision-making around whether to implement a rounding rule when setting up 
 
 85. Another asymmetry arises from the employer’s exclusive access to infor-
mation about the class of employees to whom the rule is applied.  The employer can 
select, for example, whether to apply the automatic deduction to all hourly employees, 
or only to hourly employees occupying a certain position or working at a certain loca-
tion.  The size of the affected workforce may substantially affect the viability of a class 
or collective action against the employer, imposing further uncertainty and risk for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers assessing the viability of a claim. 
 86. See Tippett, supra note 68, at 10–11. 
 87. 29 C.F.R. § 785.48 (2017). 
 88. See Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 38. 
 89. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.48 (2017); see, e.g., Corbin v. Time Warner Entm’t–Ad-
vance/Newhouse P’ship, 821 F.3d 1069, 1075, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2016) (rounding must 
be “facially neutral” and “neutral as applied”); Waine-Golston v. Time Warner Entm’t–
Advance/Newhouse P’ship, No. 11cv1057–GPB(RBB), 2013 WL 1285535, at *7 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 27, 2013); Gonzalez v. Farmington Foods, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 912, 932–
33 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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a timekeeping system.  In adopting a 7.5-minute rounding rule, a knowledgea-
ble employer would know that it is likely to come out ahead as a result of at-
tendance policies.  But because it cannot be said with 100% certainty in ad-
vance that the system will systematically disfavor employees, employers can 
tell themselves that they are colorably complying with the rule.  The violation 
arises not from the adoption of the practice but from its effect on later time 
punches. 
Employers also adopt other strategies to game the rounding rules in their 
favor.  Some employers restrict employees from punching in during rounding 
periods that are favorable to the employee.90  Others assign additional work to 
employees during periods they know will be rounded away.  For example, call 
centers will sometimes require employees to pick up incoming calls during the 
last few minutes or seconds of their scheduled shift, knowing the additional 
minutes required to complete the call will likely be rounded away.91 
Employers also use policies to create uncertainty over whether lost time 
is compensable.  Not all time spent on the employer’s worksite must be paid – 
tasks in preparation for or at the conclusion of the workday may not be com-
pensable unless they are “integral and indispensable to the principal activities 
that an employee is employed to perform.”92  Employers create uncertainty 
about the compensability of work performed during rounding periods through 
so called “grace periods,” which allow employees to punch in anytime during 
the employer-favorable rounding periods.93  If employees later challenge the 
rounding policy in a class action, the employer may then argue that the case is 
not amenable to collective treatment because individual issues predominate re-
garding whether the time was spent working.94 
Automatic break deductions benefit from similar legal ambiguity, enabled 
by outdated rules that fail to consider the ways in which software settings can 
inure to an employer’s advantage.  The FLSA does not mandate breaks of a 
 
 90. See Tippett, supra note 68, at n.79 (collecting cases). 
 91. Fisher v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2009); 
Adair v. Wis. Bell, Inc., No. 08-C-280, 2008 WL 4224360, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 11, 
2008); Russell v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 721 F. Supp. 2d 804, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Ribot v. 
Farmers Ins. Grp., No. CV 11–02404 DDP (FMOx), 2013 WL 3778784, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. July 17, 2013); see Tippett, supra note 68, at 24–25. 
 92. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 517 (2014). 
 93. See, e.g., Sali v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., No. CV 14-985 PSG (JPRX), 
2015 WL 12656937, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2015); Martinez v. DHL Express (USA) 
Inc., No. 15-22505-CIV-ALTONAGA/O’Sullivan, 2016 WL 455394, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 5, 2016); Schneider v. Union Hosp., Inc., No. 2:15-CV-00204-JMS-DKL, 2016 
WL 6037085, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2016); Kelly v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 
No. 2:13–cv–00441–JRG, 2015 WL 3464131, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2015); Tippett, 
supra note 68, at 25–27. 
 94. Tippett, supra note 68, at 24. 
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specified frequency or duration, or how breaks are recorded or tracked.95  Some 
states, like California, place strict rules on the frequency, duration, and pay-
ment of breaks and impose penalties on employers that fail to make such breaks 
available.96 
Even though many state rules are strict about break availability, they tend 
not to focus on how employers record or track those breaks.  As a result, auto-
matic break deductions implemented via software do not violate state laws per 
se.  Instead, courts tacitly permit automatic break deductions unless employees 
suffer frequent uncompensated breaks.97 
This flexible approach provides enough uncertainty about the legality of 
automatic break deductions that employers can insist that they are not know-
ingly engaging in wage theft.  Employers that do not require employees to 
punch in or out for breaks can also hide behind uncertainty as to the true num-
ber of missed breaks.  Unlike rounding, employers will not have the original 
punch information that can determine with a high degree of certainty whether 
the policy favors the employer. 
Even though the lack of records is attributable to the employer’s own 
practices, courts will sometimes refuse to certify (or decertify) automatic break 
cases on the basis that time worked must be decided on an individualized ba-
sis.98  In such cases, employees are left with the choice to litigate small-dollar 
 
 95. The FLSA is only implicated to the extent that employees work through breaks 
without payment and those unpaid breaks result in unpaid overtime or push the em-
ployee’s wage rate below minimum wage.  See supra note 64. 
 96. See Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 12 n.46 (explaining Cali-
fornia break requirements under Cal. Lab. Code § 512). 
 97. As one court explained, courts expect employers to provide a somewhat feasi-
ble method for employees to reclaim a lost break on their timecard.  See Berger v. 
Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 1:05 CV 1508, 2007 WL 2902907, at *14 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 29, 2007). 
 98. In Gessele v. Jack in the Box, a federal district court in Oregon declined to 
certify a collective action in a case involving a complex set of break rules based on 
actual punch times and automatically-deducted breaks.  Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 
No. 3:10–CV–00960–ST, 2013 WL 1326538, at *6 (D. Or. Apr. 1, 2013).  The software 
was structured to include a half-hour automatic unpaid meal break, which could only 
be overridden by a supervisor.  Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10–cv–960–ST, 
2013 WL 1326563, at *22 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013).  The software also assumed rest 
breaks of twenty minutes or fewer were paid.  Id.  The dispute arose over interrupted 
meal breaks that lasted more than twenty minutes but fewer than thirty minutes.  Id.  
Whether due to oversight or an intentional decision by the employer, interrupted meal 
breaks between twenty-one and twenty-nine minutes were treated as unpaid, contrary 
to state law.  See id. at *22–23.  For reasons that are unclear, the court also expressed 
uncertainty about the number of minutes worked during these interrupted breaks.  Id. 
at *24.  Rather than punishing the employer for its sloppy software implementation or 
the poor recordkeeping of supervisors responsible for recording the interrupted breaks, 
the court concluded that the information gap made the case unsuitable for decision 
through a collective action.  See id. at *37.  In other words, the ambiguity ultimately 
allowed the employer to avoid liability for its practices. 
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cases individually or to drop their claims.  In reality, this means that employees 
have no practical remedy for their lost wages, and the employer’s incentive to 
adopt more accurate break-tracking practices is reduced. 
Thus, timekeeping software – with embedded rules like rounding and au-
tomatic break deductions – can erode wage and hour law compliance and ob-
scure employers’ violations.  This employment law hack exploits outdated reg-
ulations and legal ambiguity, resulting in wage loss for employees and “cover” 
from liability for employers. 
IV.  SCREENING AND SELECTION ALGORITHMS 
Whereas employers use timekeeping software to manage employees’ 
time and pay, screening and selection software operate at different phases of 
the employment relationship.  As Cathy O’Neil documents in her book, Weap-
ons of Math Destruction, large employers are increasingly turning to selection 
algorithms to sift through the mountains of applications they receive online.99  
They also use algorithms to evaluate employees for compensation and reten-
tion purposes.100  This Part uses screening and selection software, and the al-
gorithms that the software deploys, as a further example of the ways in which 
software can exploit scalability and automaticity, information asymmetries, 
and an outdated regulatory framework to violate employment law. 
A.  Exploitation of Automation and Scalability 
In many ways, employers’ use of software to automate screening and se-
lection represents an improvement upon prior practice.  As Pauline Kim and 
others have explained, selection algorithms can ensure a certain baseline level 
of compliance with antidiscrimination laws and can be superior to pre-digital 
employee selection practices in avoiding bias.101  Software can be structured to 
deliver seemingly objective, nondiscriminatory assessments of applicants or 
employees.  For example, an employer can avoid asking about an applicant’s 
race, gender, religion, age, leave-history, disability, or other protected cate-
gory.  If the software does not “know” about an applicant’s protected status, 
then, at the very least, it avoids explicit bias.  Likewise, a performance evalua-
tion algorithm that uses factors highly predictive of job success may be prefer-
able to the highly subjective evaluations that are vulnerable to implicit bias.102 
 
 99. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA 
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 108 (2016). 
 100. Id. at 134–40 (using teacher evaluation algorithms to explore the latter appli-
cation); see also Cramblett v. McHugh, No. 3:10–CV–54–PK, 2012 WL 7681280, at 
*18 (D. Or. Nov. 19, 2012) (referencing “computerized algorithm” used to assess re-
sumes for minimal qualifications). 
 101. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 857, 920–21 (2017). 
 102. This is the very theory that spawned Wal-Mart v. Dukes, along with related 
copycat lawsuits and multimillion dollar settlements.  In that case, the women plaintiffs 
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Even if software improves compliance in some ways, it can also erode 
compliance at the margins.  The problem, as O’Neil explains, is that the math 
underlying the algorithm is trying to maximize some measure specified by the 
employer – for example, minimum qualification standards, or, in the case of 
teacher assessments, student improvement in test scores year over year.103  The 
software will do so using all data made available to it – whether it be infor-
mation harvested from social media networks, credit scores, or scores on a psy-
chometric test.  As both O’Neil and Kim explain, if any of the original input 
data is correlated with membership in a protected category – zip code, for ex-
ample – then the algorithm may treat applicants differently on the basis of a 
protected class after all.104  Kim also notes that algorithms may replicate errors 
in the data that systematically disfavor employees in certain protected catego-
ries (e.g., women who have changed their names are more likely to be subject 
to database error that misidentifies them as having a criminal record).105 
Software also tends to reproduce the status quo.106  If the measure of suc-
cess on the job is itself the product of discrimination, then predictors of that 
success will likely reproduce that result.107  As O’Neil explains, suppose a com-
pany seeks to recruit up-and-coming software programmers.108  The company 
designs an algorithm to identify potential candidates by assessing the size of 
their online social networks or the frequency with which they engage in social 
network activity.109  If those networks are predominantly male, then the soft-
ware will rate male programmers as better candidates than their female coun-
terparts, who do not show up on the social network measure.  It may be, how-
ever, that there are talented female programmers who are doing other things 
with their time.110  If one of those “other” female programmers applies for a 
job that uses the social network algorithm, she will receive a lower rating be-
cause the software does not incorporate the variables that would otherwise 
identify her as promising.  In sum, algorithms are not in the business of looking 
for new pathways to success; they identify and entrench existing ones instead. 
Like timekeeping software, selection algorithms do not produce blatant, 
wildly illegal outcomes in every case.  Presumably, a selection algorithm that 
 
claimed that Wal-Mart’s policy granting store managers discretion to make pay and 
promotion decisions based largely on subjective criteria constituted sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342–43 (2011).  Although the Dukes plaintiffs ultimately lost, 
the sheer volume of related litigation – especially against large employers – may have 
pushed employers to consider other types of selection practices to reduce litigation risk 
and compliance costs, including those aided and implemented by software. 
 103. See O’NEIL, supra note 99, at 136–37. 
 104. Kim, supra note 101, at 877–78; O’NEIL, supra note 98, at 108–09. 
 105. Kim, supra note 101, at 885–86. 
 106. See id. at 872–83. 
 107. See id. at 876. 
 108. O’NEIL, supra note 99, at 119–20. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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only selected men, or only selected white candidates, would be rooted out and 
discontinued quickly.  Instead, the disadvantages pile up at a statistical level, 
with disadvantaged groups receiving a demerit here or a demerit there that 
make them less desirable candidates overall.  This may not make a difference 
for each candidate, but it may affect candidates on the margin.  And where 
multiple employers use similar selection algorithms, these can render a border-
line candidate completely unemployable.  O’Neil tells the story of a candidate 
with a history of mental illness who found himself systematically excluded 
from all entry-level jobs in his town.111  The tests that employers used did not 
ask whether he had a history of mental illness, but the psychometric algorithms 
used in the online selection questions evidently declared him unfit.112 
B.  Exploitation of Information Asymmetries 
Applicants or employees who experience discrimination as a result of a 
facially neutral employer practice – such as the operation of a screening or 
selection algorithm – traditionally turn to disparate impact law to seek a rem-
edy.113  In a disparate impact claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the em-
ployer’s policy, test, or rule, when put into practice, produces a discriminatory 
effect on the basis of a protected criterion, e.g., race or sex.114 
Like rounding and automatic break deductions, however, information 
asymmetries make software-implemented disparate impacts difficult for em-
ployees to detect.  Disparate impact cases have always presented a challenge 
for plaintiffs because only the employer has access to aggregate data on the 
statistical effect of the employment test at issue.  This problem is compounded 
when screening and selection software relies on data mining because the appli-
cant or employee may not know the sources of information from which the 
employer has drawn.  For example, software may use information culled from 
social media.  It might also use credit worthiness information from third parties 
that do not qualify as “credit rating” agencies under the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, thus avoiding that law’s disclosure rules.115 
 
 111. Id. at 105–07. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CAL. L. REV. 671, 694 (2016). 
 114. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328–29 (1977). 
 115. For example, LinkedIn used to offer a featured called “reference search,” 
which identified contacts common to both the employer and the applicant.  Sweet v. 
LinkedIn Corp., No. 5:14–cv–04531–PSG, 2015 WL 1744254, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
14, 2015).  The plaintiffs in that case alleged that putative employers surreptitiously 
contacted past employers using the “reference search” function and that they were de-
nied employment based on those discussions.  Id. at *3–4.  The trial court dismissed 
the case on the basis that LinkedIn did not qualify as a “consumer reporting agency” 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).  Id. at *10.  Had LinkedIn been covered 
by the FCRA, employers would have been required to obtain applicants’ consent before 
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Further, software that determines employees’ pay and promotion often 
relies on a combination of subjective and data-driven assessments – for exam-
ple, supervisors’ performance evaluations, plus other metrics that are weighted 
and combined by an algorithm.116  Employers are under no duty to disclose the 
metrics used and could very well rely on data gathered in the workplace that is 
deemed predictive of success – for example, number of hours spent in the of-
fice, size of business network (measured by email frequency), number of words 
typed, amount of time spent surfing the web, and frequency and duration of 
contact with others.  For the most part, this information could be gathered sur-
reptitiously and its application unknown to affected employees.  And to the 
extent that these data are correlated with membership in a protected class – 
women who spend fewer hours in the office due to dependent care obligations 
but who are more productive during that time, for example – software’s reli-
ance on the data can produce an unlawful disparate impact. 
This is in some ways structurally similar to timekeeping software, in that 
affected individuals may never know they were harmed or may not be able to 
identify the mechanism by which the harm occurred.  Therefore, potential 
plaintiffs may not be equipped with sufficient information for attorneys to as-
sess whether they have a viable claim. 
C.  Exploitation of Outdated and Ill-Fitting Legal Rules 
Finally, like timekeeping software, employers’ use of compliance-erod-
ing selection algorithms is enabled by an inexact fit between existing rules and 
the current factual context.  In theory, these selection algorithms are no differ-
ent from the kind of written tests that originally gave rise to disparate impact 
jurisprudence in the 1970s.117  Using reams of data to “predict” who is a good 
hire is conceptually indistinguishable from using a written test to identify apti-
 
using the “reference search” feature and would have also been entitled to notice of an 
adverse employment decision based on the results of that search.  Id. at *6.   LinkedIn 
subsequently discontinued the service.  Bob Sullivan, Tempted to Accept that LinkedIn 
Invitation? Think Twice, YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://finance.ya-
hoo.com/news/tempted-accept-linkedin-invitation-think-154525936.html. 
 116. See Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 297–98 (5th Cir. 2000) (combines automated 
system with employee appraisal scores from a supervisor); Chacko v. Connecticut, No. 
3:07–cv–1120 (CFD), 2010 WL 1330861, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2010) (plaintiff 
claimed that Asian doctors assigned heavier workloads as a result of patient assignment 
algorithm and supervisor decisions regarding coverage assignments); Cramblett v. 
McHugh, No. 3:10–CV–54–PK, 2012 WL 7681280, at *18–19 (D. Or. Nov. 19, 2012) 
(algorithm weeded out unqualified candidates at a preliminary stage, and then manager 
reviewed resumes and ranked candidates); Onyiah v. St. Cloud State Univ., 684 F.3d 
711, 715 (8th Cir. 2012) (algorithm calculated salary range, dean selected a salary 
within that range); Coleman v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593, 609–11 (S.D. 
Tex. 2001) (individual ranking list prepared by managers combined according to a com-
puter algorithm). 
 117. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426, 436 (establishing disparate impact claim). 
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tude for a job.  However, like other regulatory hacks, selection algorithms rep-
resent a problem for regulators because they are different enough from the old 
tests, and the rules that arose to regulate them, to allow employers to escape 
liability for noncompliance. 
The legal rules regarding employer screening and selection practices re-
flect a pre-digital testing model.  Promulgated in 1978, the Uniform Guidelines 
on Employee Selection Procedures offer employers various means of validat-
ing tests, depending on what the test seeks to measure (e.g., personality traits, 
job tasks, or skills associated with job success).118  The U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission and other federal agencies use these guidelines 
to assess the legality of employers’ screening and selection practices, though 
they are not binding on courts.119  Regardless, the Uniform Guidelines are of 
limited utility in evaluating screening and selection software, as data mining 
by algorithm does not fit exactly within any of the categories that the Uniform 
Guidelines offer.  In theory, such processes seek to predict job success, but not 
necessarily, or exclusively, through job skills or personality traits. 
 
 118. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures sorted the then-
existing tests into three categories, within which employers were expected to validate 
the test using prescribed procedures.  29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1–1607.16 (2017).  These tests 
consisted of (1) those that measured employee traits – for example personality tests or 
IQ tests (“construct validity”); (2) those that mirrored components of the job itself 
(“content validity”) – for example a driving test for a truck driving job; and (3) those 
that measured for knowledge or skills predictive of success on the job (“criterion” va-
lidity) – for example, production rate.  Id. at § 1607.14.  The Guidelines set forth com-
plex rules that delineated how to validate a test, which often required the services of an 
industrial or organizational psychologist to perform an in-depth job analysis and then 
develop or identify potential measures.  For construct validity and criterion validity, 
this typically also involved testing the measure on a sample of workers representative 
of the “relevant labor market” to verify whether the measure was in fact statistically 
predictive of success on the job.  Id. at § 1607.14(B)(4).  For content validity, this in-
volved showing that the test mirrored the job itself.  Id. at § 1607.14(C).  Employers in 
the private sector balked at the expense and complexity of the Uniform Guidelines and 
abandoned them in favor of more subjective selection practices, which did not require 
a robust statistical and procedural defense.  See generally Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a 
Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective 
Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433 (2012) (describing the op-
eration of the Uniform Guidelines); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red 
Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1487, 1491–92 (1996) (noting the historical difficulty of proving a disparate im-
pact in hiring); Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Recon-
struction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 
EMORY L.J. 409, 513–18 (1998) (describing the Uniform Guidelines).  
 119. George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1477 
(1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS) (1992)) (describing the guidelines as “adopted 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other federal agencies as non-
binding interpretations of Title VII. These guidelines do impose very strict standards 
of validation, but they rarely have been strictly applied by the courts”). 
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Indeed, as Pauline Kim observes, data mining is atheoretical – heavy on 
evidence, short on theory.120  By contrast, the rules assume testing that is heavy 
on theory but short on evidentiary support.121  The Uniform Guidelines are 
therefore intended to demand a baseline quantum of evidence to support the 
application of theoretical models.  Kim predicts that these rules will be inef-
fective at curbing the use of selection algorithms because (circularly) their use 
is supported by the reams of data that generated the algorithms in the first 
place.122 
Selection algorithms also exploit uncertainty because the mechanics of 
their operation are opaque.  In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the U.S. 
Supreme Court required plaintiffs to identify which particular components of 
a selection process produced a disparate impact.123  This was somewhat 
straightforward when components of a selection process were discrete or read-
ily identifiable.124  This process becomes more difficult when data mining 
draws on multiple variables, some of which interact.  Was it zip code data or 
data about an applicant’s attitudes that resulted in his or her rejection for a job?  
The answer may be one, the other, a combination, or some other variable.  Alt-
hough the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act includes an exception for 
situations in which the components of an employment practice are not separa-
ble,125 the plaintiff bears the burden of showing inseparability.126  In practice, 
 
 120. Kim, supra note 101, 879–80. 
 121. See id. at 909. 
 122. See id. at 894. 
 123. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), modified, 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015). 
 124. For example, in Wards Cove, the plaintiffs challenged a multi-step selection 
process.  Id. at 651–52.  Under the disparate impact case law that defined these issues 
at the time, it was always reasonably clear to the person taking (or subject to) a test 
what the test was measuring, e.g., height and weight, firefighter policies and 
knowledge, high school-level academic achievement.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys assessing a 
case could make an educated guess about the likely effect of the test on employment 
outcomes.  And indeed, the Wards Cove Court required the plaintiff to identify which 
particular aspect of the test caused the disparate impact.  Id. at 657 (“As a general mat-
ter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular em-
ployment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.”). 
 125. Kim, supra note 101, at 914–15; 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012) 
(“With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a dispar-
ate impact . . . the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged 
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party 
can demonstrate to the court that the elements . . . are not capable of separation for 
analysis . . . [it] may be analyzed as one employment practice.”). 
 126. See Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary 
judgment against plaintiff where plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove 
that statistical impact could not be isolated to a particular portion of the selection pro-
cess, or the interaction between the secret algorithm and subjective employment prac-
tices). 
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this burden is difficult to meet when the software-driven selection process is 
complex or opaque.127 
Moreover, when screening and selection programs use machine learning, 
a process by which the software independently updates the variables or inter-
actions it considers in reaction to the data it receives, even employers may not 
know which inputs are driving the outcomes.128  Employers may also be in the 
dark when screening and selection software is obtained from a third party ven-
dor that treats the algorithm’s design and operation as a trade secret.129  To the 
extent employers are themselves the software designers, they may use the trade 
secret argument to their own advantage as well.130  In one recent case involving 
software implemented by a public employer, for example, the employer refused 
to disclose its secret promotion algorithm.131  The court declined to compel 
production, reasoning that it was irrelevant, but then dismissed the case on the 
basis that the plaintiff had failed to identify the discriminatory employment 
practice with sufficient specificity.132 
Thus, screening and selection software, like timekeeping programs, can 
exploit scalability, information asymmetries, and badly fitting legal rules to 
enable employers to violate employment law.  While the violations themselves 
– screening that produces discriminatory outcomes, wage theft accomplished 
by shaving workers’ hours – may not be new, software can spread the viola-
tions across entire workforces and hide the violations from the would-be en-
forcers.  This presents a challenge for workplace regulation writ large because 
legal rules lag behind by employers’ software-aided innovations in noncompli-
ance. 
Next, we examine a different form of regulatory hack, where employers 
do not violate the law, but rather side-step it.  Here, employers lawfully avoid 
compliance costs through software.  These avoidance strategies can be prob-
lematic because they create new kinds of harms and re-set work norms in un-
anticipated ways, placing them beyond the reach of current employment laws. 
 
 127. See id. 
 128. Kim, supra note 101, at 921–22. 
 129. See, e.g., Section of Intellectual Property Law: Trade Secrets and Interfer-
ences with Contracts, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/commit-
tee.cfm?com=PT041000 (last visited Dec. 20, 2017) (providing 2015/2016 report list-
ing multiple cases in which developers claimed trade secret protection for algorithms 
that perform a variety of functions); Elizabeth Minkel, Transcript: Cathy O’Neil Talks 
“Weapons of Math Destruction”, TRACK CHANGES (Nov. 29, 2016), https://track-
changes.postlight.com/track-changes-podcast-39-cathy-oneil-talks-weapons-of-math-
destruction-transcript-fb668885e73. 
 130. Muñoz, 200 F.3d at 304. 
 131. Id. at 305. 
 132. Id. at 305–07. 
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V.  SCHEDULING SOFTWARE 
While timekeeping software allows managers to review, edit, and process 
employees’ time ex post, after work has been performed, scheduling software 
operates ex ante, allowing managers to assign, monitor, and change employees’ 
work shifts ahead of time.  Like timekeeping software, scheduling software 
allows employers to automate and scale tasks previously performed by humans 
with pen and paper.  The software also allows data mining and predictive ana-
lytics so that employers can “right size” their workforce to fit customer de-
mand133 or – most importantly for this discussion – prevent an employee’s 
hours from triggering an hours-contingent compliance cost.  In this way, sched-
uling software operates as an avoidance hack. 
A.  Scheduling Software as an Avoidance Hack 
We use the term “avoidance hack” in this Part to refer to a specific form 
of regulatory arbitrage: employers’ lawful use of scheduling software to mon-
itor employees’ hours and avoid various benefits-triggering thresholds embed-
ded in the law. 
Specifically, the FLSA and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 (“ACA”, also known popularly as “Obamacare”) both establish 
work-hour thresholds above which employees must receive, respectively, over-
time premium pay and health insurance coverage.  Under the FLSA, eligible 
employees are owed an overtime premium for every hour worked in excess of 
forty hours per week.134  The ACA, in turn, requires most large employers to 
offer health insurance to employees with an average of thirty or more work 
hours per week, or 130 hours per month.135  These hours-contingent require-
ments are ripe for avoidance hacks, in which employers use software’s tracking 
and data mining functionalities to ensure that employees do not trigger benefits 
or payment obligations. 
 
 133. For a study of a retailer’s use of scheduling controls to align labor costs with 
customer demand, see JULIA R. HENLY & SUSAN J. LAMBERT, WORK SCHEDULING 
STUDY: A PROFILE OF RETAIL SALES ASSOCIATES IN A WOMEN’S APPAREL FIRM (2015), 
https://ssascholars.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/work-scheduling-
study/files/wss_profile_of_retail_sales_associates.pdf.  Additional research on sched-
uling practices for hourly workers can be found at Work Scheduling Study Papers, U. 
CHI. SCH. SOC. SERV. ADMIN., 
http://ssascholars.uchicago.edu/work-scheduling-study/work-scheduling-study-papers 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
 134. See supra note 64.  Some states have more generous requirements.  See State 
Overtime Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/labor-and-employment/state-overtime-requirements.aspx (last updated Jan. 1, 
2014) (listing overtime requirements under state law). 
 135. Identifying Full-Time Employees, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/identifying-full-time-employees 
(last updated Nov. 22, 2017) (explaining employee eligibility requirements). 
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For example, software company OnShift sells scheduling and other work-
force management programs designed for senior care providers.136  OnShift’s 
scheduling software allows managers to monitor employee hours in real 
time.137  When an employee is nearing forty hours, the software alerts manag-
ers, who can send the employee home and call in a replacement who has 
worked fewer hours.138  OnShift also allows employers to predict overtime risk 
ahead of time and schedule staff accordingly.139  The software automatically 
accounts for these peak labor periods and allows managers to schedule more 
staff, instead of allowing employees to amass overtime hours.  Likewise, On-
Shift markets its scheduling software specifically as a way for employers to 
“set their scheduling parameters to avoid pushing over their ACA part-time 
hours’ threshold.”140  In other words, employers avoid coverage under the 
ACA.  Kronos, another scheduling software provider, summarizes, “Schedul-
ing is a balancing act.  Take the guesswork out of scheduling by automating 
the process of aligning labor to demand and gaining better visibility to em-
ployee attributes.  More often than not, there is room to further optimize a 
schedule for better bottom-line results and better employee satisfaction.”141 
Employers attribute big savings to such software-enabled scheduling op-
timization.  A testimonial by a human resources director for assisted living 
homes described saving $250,000 per year in overtime costs after implement-
ing scheduling software.142  The Chief Financial Officer of Jamba Juice re-
ported taking “‘400, 500 basis points out of our labor costs’ . . . a savings of 
millions of dollars a year,” with the help of scheduling software.143  Similarly, 
the management of Dave & Buster’s, a nationwide, publicly traded arcade, 
amusement, and restaurant company, has claimed that implementation of the 
ACA would cost the company as much as $2 million, which could be saved via 
converting full-time workers’ hours to part-time.144 
 
 136. About Us, ONSHIFT, https://onshift.com/about (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
 137. Employee Scheduling Software, ONSHIFT, https://onshift.com/staff-schedul-
ing-software (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
138. See  ONSHIFT, THE STAFFING ADVANTAGE: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE LABOR COSTS 
3, 5 (on file with authors).  
 139. Id. at 3, 5. 
 140. Steve Moran, Will the Affordable Care Act Be Your Big Gotcha in 2015?, 
SENIOR HOUSING F. (Oct. 29, 2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.seniorhousing-
forum.net/blog/2014/10/19/will-affordable-care-act-be-your-big-gotcha-2015 (inter-
viewing OnShift CEO Mark Woodka). 
 141. Jennifer Ardery, 3 Ways to Optimize Employee Work Schedules, KRONOS (Jan. 
15, 2015), https://itsabouttime.kronos.com/2015/01/15/3-ways-to-optimize-employee-
work-schedules/. 
 142. See Arnold, supra note 2. 
 143. Steven Greenhouse, A Part-Time Life, as Hours Shrink and Shift, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/business/a-part-time-life-as-
hours-shrink-and-shift-for-american-workers.html. 
 144. Marin v. Dave & Buster’s Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 460, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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Importantly, the practice of software-enabled schedule optimization, 
whether offered by OnShift, Kronos, or one of their many competitors, does 
not violate employment law.  As one of us has noted in other work: 
U.S. employers have wide discretion over [scheduling decisions], 
and the [FLSA], the main legal mechanism for assuring a wage floor 
for workers, does not reach this issue.  Though the FLSA guarantees a 
minimum wage for all hours worked and requires overtime pay for more 
than forty work hours per week, it does not establish minimum hours 
requirements or regulate employers’ scheduling practices.  Nor does it 
offer protection to a worker who is given fewer work hours than she 
believed a job would provide.145 
Indeed, an employer that uses scheduling software to control workers’ 
hours to avoid overtime or ACA compliance is likely driven by the same cost-
saving motivation as the employer that uses rounding rules or automatic break 
deductions to shave workers’ hours.  The former is a lawful avoidance hack, 
however; the latter is of questionable legality.  This is because the law requires 
employees to be paid for the hours that they have already worked but creates 
no entitlement to the opportunity to work, i.e., the chance to work overtime or 
to work in a job for more than thirty hours per week.  And while employers 
have always been able to negotiate this distinction by controlling workers’ 
shifts, scheduling software allows them to do so with unprecedented efficiency, 
scale, and precision.  These avoidance strategies can harm employees in ways 
that are unanticipated by employment law and, in some sectors, are disrupting 
old work norms around the predictability and stability of worker schedules. 
B.  Creation of Unanticipated Harms and Disruption of Work Norms 
When employers use scheduling software to keep an employee’s hours 
below a certain threshold, that worker experiences a harm in the form of a lost 
opportunity for overtime or insurance coverage.  However, these harms are an-
ticipated – and deemed acceptable – under existing rules.  In other words, by 
declining to create an entitlement to overtime or health insurance for all work-
ers, employment law declines to treat the loss of those benefits as a compensa-
ble harm. 
However, employers’ use of scheduling software can cause substantial 
harm to employees beyond the loss of benefits or pay.  Left to its own devices, 
for example, software is indifferent to scheduling a retail employee for a “clo-
pening” shift – where he or she closes the store late at night and then is called 
at the last minute to return the next morning to open it again.146  Indeed, sched-
uling algorithms produce many last-minute shift changes, as they incorporate 
new information and attempt to prevent employees from working overtime or 
 
 145. Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low-
Wage Work, 50 HARV. C.L.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (footnotes omitted).  
 146. O’NEIL, supra note 99, at 125–26. 
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exceeding their part-time hours.147  While the employees who are approaching 
the thirty- or forty-hour threshold can reasonably expect to be dismissed, the 
replacement workers may have little expectation that they will be called to 
work.  And while those replacement employees might like the additional pay, 
they may not like the inconvenience (or extreme difficulty, and high cost) of 
finding child or dependent care on a moment’s notice.148 
Unpredictable work hours can also prevent employees from taking on 
second jobs, enrolling and staying in school, engaging in family and leisure 
activity, and meeting savings goals.149  With respect to income volatility, for 
example, one recent analysis of bank records by the J.P. Morgan Chase Insti-
tute found that “for nearly one in four jobs . . . paycheck amounts varied by 
more than 30 percent from paycheck to paycheck.”150  Attempts to plan and 
save, given such an unreliable income stream, are extremely difficult. 
Further, research suggests that existing norms around scheduling have be-
gun to change in many workplaces, as employers dispense with predictable, set 
schedules and adopt an on-call or variable approach to workers’ hours.  For 
instance, software-aided scheduling can push employees to offer “open avail-
ability” to their employers, being ready to appear at work at nearly any time 
during operating hours.151  At some companies, employees who decline last 
minute call-ins do so at the risk of losing their jobs or having their own hours 
reduced in the future.152  Moreover, some scheduling software companies ad-
vertise a feature that generates lists of all employees, from across an entire firm, 
with the skills necessary to fill in when another worker is sent home.153  This 
means that nearly all employees are functionally on call at all times and do not 
have the information to gauge when they are likely to be selected. 
 
 147. See id. 
 148. See generally Charlotte S. Alexander & Anna Haley-Lock, Underwork, Work-
Hour Insecurity, and a New Approach to Wage and Hour Regulation, 54 INDUS. REL. 
695, 699–704 (2015) (summarizing research on harms to workers caused by scheduling 
variability and unpredictability). 
 149. See id. 
 150. DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE 
PLATFORM ECONOMY: BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY 16 (2016), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatil-
ity-2-report.pdf; accord Patricia Cohen, Steady Jobs, with Pay and Hours that Are An-




 151. See Susan J. Lambert, Passing the Buck: Labor Flexibility Practices that 
Transfer Risk onto Hourly Workers, 61 HUM. REL. 1203, 1217 (2008) (describing “open 
availability” requirements). 
 152. See Pei-Chun Lai & Tom Baum, Just-in-Time Labour Supply in the Hotel Sec-
tor: The Role of Agencies, 27 EMP. REL. 86, 88 (2005) (describing open availability 
requirement for restaurant workers, who would lose their jobs if they refused call-ins). 
 153. See ONSHIFT, supra note 138, at 5. 
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Indeed, unstable schedules may be the new normal.  A recent study by the 
Brookings Institution found that “household income became noticeably more 
volatile between the early 1970s and the late 2000s” and attributed much of 
that change to “greater volatility in earnings per hour and in hours worked.”154  
Other studies note similar trends, particularly in industries such as retail and 
hospitality that rely to a great extent on low-wage, hourly-paid workers.155  And 
researchers lay blame squarely at the feet of scheduling software: “Facilitated 
by new software technology, many employers are adopting a human resource 
strategy of hiring a cadre of part-time employees whose work schedules are 
modified, often on short notice.”156 
One might dismiss these harms as an acceptable result of the legislative 
line drawing that enables employers to engage in avoidance strategies in the 
first place.  As others have argued, regulatory arbitrage is an expected result of 
legal rules that privilege form over substance (in this case, compliance costs 
triggered by a specified number of weekly hours worked).157  However, some 
legislators and policymakers have begun to view work hour instability as out-
side the set of harms that employees might reasonably be expected to bear, 
which we examine in Part VII.158  Next, we present our final case study of 
software-enabled employment law hacks: work distribution platforms. 
VI.  WORK DISTRIBUTION PLATFORMS 
This Part examines the use of work distribution or intermediation plat-
forms by firms that operate in the so-called gig economy.159  Building on the 
work of anthropologists Ilana Gershon and Melissa Cefkin, we focus specifi-
cally on the examples of ride-sharing company Uber and Amazon’s Mechani-
cal Turk, an “online marketplace for work.”  Both firms use software to connect 
workers (drivers and online task-completers known as “Turkers,” respectively) 
directly with customers, and both firms disclaim any employer-employee rela-
tionship with those who offer services via the firms’ platforms.  These firms 
 
 154. KAREN DYNAN, DOUGLAS ELMENDORF & DANIEL SICHEL, THE EVOLUTION OF 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME VOLATILITY 2      (2012) (emphasis added), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/household-income-volatility-dynan.pdf.  
 155. LONNIE GOLDEN, IRREGULAR WORK SCHEDULING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4 
(2015), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/82524.pdf (“Such jobs are disproportionately 
found in the service occupations and in the retail and wholesale trade and services in-
dustries, such as hospitality and leisure, professional and business services, and health 
services.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Fleischer, supra note 21, at 229–30. 
 158. Some employers, too, have abandoned the practice.  See Bourree Lam, The 
End of On-Call Scheduling?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/business/archive/2015/10/on-call-scheduling-labor/412132/. 
 159. We borrow the terms “work distribution platforms” and “work intermediation 
platforms” from anthropologists Ilana Gershon and Melissa Cefkin.  Gershon & Cefkin, 
supra note 6. 
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use software to split traditional managerial tasks among multiple entities – cus-
tomers, the gig firms, and the workers themselves.  This splintering creates 
difficulties in identifying an “employee,” an “employer,” and an “employment 
relationship” in these work arrangements – prerequisites for the application of 
most employment laws.160  Thus, the firms attempt an avoidance hack on a 
grand scale, avoiding the entire set of wage and hour, antidiscrimination, work-
ers’ compensation, family and medical leave, and other legal and regulatory 
obligations contingent on employee status. 
There is nothing inherently unlawful in this strategy: a firm is free to 
choose a business model that relies on non-employee workers and to use soft-
ware to connect those workers with customers.  However, gig firms’ use of 
work distribution platforms raises two sets of concerns.  First, what looks like 
avoidance sometimes turns out to be noncompliance.  Instead of making a clean 
break from the employment relationship, some gig firms exercise control over 
workers who use their platforms, engaging in what might be called “false 
avoidance.”161  That control entitles gig workers to all of the protections of 
employment law, but they must first win a misclassification claim in court to 
vindicate their rights. 
Second, many gig firms engage in “true” avoidance – leaving workers to 
their own devices and leaving the customer and worker to negotiate the terms 
of their relationship.  Though these firms violate no employment law, like the 
scheduling software described above, their avoidance practices may create new 
harms for workers and upend traditional work norms in problematic ways.  Fur-
ther, if enough firms successfully avoid the employment relationship, then em-
ployment law as a whole may be weakened.  This form of avoidance operates 
as a kind of meta-hack, posing an existential challenge to the regulatory project. 
This Part begins to engage with these issues, using the examples of Uber 
and Mechanical Turk.  Part VII turns to possible regulatory responses. 
A.  The Splintering of Roles 
Uber and Mechanical Turk both rely on software “platforms” to connect 
customers and workers.  As Gershon and Cefkin describe it, this software 
“make[s] it possible for work to be distributed by ‘open-call’ rather than by 
 
 160. Charlotte S. Alexander, Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 101 MINN. L. REV. 907, 907–08 (2017) (explaining coverage of federal 
employment laws relative to protections for independent contractors). 
 161. Tippett, supra note 31, at 574–76 (finding that several ride-sharing companies 
exercised similar levels of control as taxi and delivery companies, although many “ser-
vice sharing” companies exercised considerably less control over workers than temp 
agencies); De Stefano, supra note 31, at 481 (describing “disguised employment rela-
tionships, or sham self-employment [intended] to circumvent labor and social security 
regulation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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assignment or pre-defined job role requirements.”162  Thus, Uber allows ride-
seekers to place a virtual “open call” for a ride via the company’s app, and 
Mechanical Turk operates as a “marketplace for work” where requesters post 
“microtasks” for completion by anonymous online workers.163  Orly Lobel 
adds to this conception of the “platform economy,” noting, “Platform compa-
nies adamantly endeavor to be defined first and foremost by what they are 
not.”164  According to these firms, they “are not selling the thing itself: the 
service, the product, the content.  Rather, they are selling access to the software, 
the matching algorithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between 
their users.”165  In other words, gig firms’ use of software may allow them to 
avoid the employer-employee relationship.166 
At the center of this avoidance hack is work distribution platforms’ par-
celing out of task management and control functions among customers, the gig 
firms, and the workers themselves.  In a traditional employer-employee rela-
tionship, the customer first seeks out the employer.  The employer then assigns 
tasks to employees, the results of which are delivered back to the customer.  
Thus, in stylized form, the workflow among the three parties might look some-
thing like item A in Figure 1, below. 
 
 
 162. Gershon & Cefkin, supra note 6, at 2; see also Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual 
Work, supra note 30, at 967–69 (describing Mechanical Turk as a form of crowdsourc-
ing); Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 577–78 (describing same); De 
Stefano supra note 31, at 484 (describing the “fissurization” of business structure in the 
gig economy). 
 163. Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited Dec. 20, 2017) (“Amazon Me-
chanical Turk . . . operates a marketplace for work . . . .”); Gershon & Cefkin, supra 
note 6, at 4–5 (describing microtasks). 
 164. Lobel, supra note 31, at 100. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Companies within the “gig economy” may seek to avoid legal rules beyond 
employment laws.  Uber might be avoiding rules regarding taxi medallions, transpor-
tation regulations, and taxes.  See Yglesias, supra note 40.  A company like AirBnB 
might be avoiding various laws and taxes that apply to the hospitality industry.  How-
ever, we do not mean to suggest that companies use software primarily for the purpose 
of avoiding regulation.  Technology also offers convenience and efficiencies that cus-
tomers and workers find appealing. 
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Figure 1: Two Ways of Looking at Gig Work: Task Management 
If this structure were reproduced in the context of the gig economy, the 
firm would stand in for the employer and the gig workers for the employees.  
In that view, the gig firms receive requests for services from customers via the 
software platform, and then, again via their software, assign those requests to 
workers, who deliver the services to customers.  However, as Lobel points out, 
gig firms frequently portray their business models as operating something like 
item B instead.  In this structure, customers seek out services and workers seek 
out tasks via the firms’ software, which functions only as a hiring hall or mar-
ketplace, a background space in which workers and customers meet and inter-
act directly.167  The firm’s passive role in this depiction of gig work is indicated 
by the dotted border in item B. 
Along with this difference in the management of work tasks, gig firms 
claim that workers experience control in a different way in their model.  In the 
traditional structure, the employer controls the employee’s work and assesses 
his or her performance.  This is indicated in item A in Figure 2 below by the 
heavy arrow between employer and employee.  Employers may also rely on 
customer judgments, which are commonly used to evaluate employees.  How-
ever, the employer functions as a filter through which customer feedback 
passes back to employees. 
 
 
 167. Gershon & Cefkin, supra note 6, at 24 (“[Gig firms like Uber] argue that they 
are not a firm providing transportation services, but rather a technology company ena-
bling small business-owners, their drivers, to connect to customers.” (citing Julia To-
massetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced 






   (Gig firm)    (Workers) 
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Figure 2: Two Ways of Looking at Gig Work: Control 
If gig firms function as a version of the traditional employment relation-
ship, then control would pass from the gig firm directly to workers in the same 
way.  Gig companies, however, claim that workers are controlled and assessed 
directly by customers, via software.168  This structure is shown in item B.  Uber, 
for example, instructs customers to rate drivers by assigning a number of stars 
following their ride.  Low-rated drivers can eventually be disenrolled from the 
Uber platform entirely.169  Conversely, the software gives high-rated, VIP Uber 
drivers access to customers in close proximity to their current location.  On the 
Mechanical Turk platform, workers are not paid at all for the tasks they com-
plete if the customer refuses.170  Workers receive a rating based on the fre-
quency with which customers have rejected their work.171  And like Uber VIP 
drivers, “[t]he most productive are invited to become ‘Masters’ and gain ex-
clusive access to better-paying tasks.”172  This entire system of evaluation and 
work assignment is implemented via software.173  As Gershon and Cefkin ob-
serve, “Algorithms guide the selection of where and how to place inputs to the 
system. . . . While numerous factors may be used in the design of the algo-
rithms, most include an element of frequency or density of prior activity,” 
along with customer reviews.174 
 
 168. See Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 597; Cunningham-
Parmeter, supra note 31, at 1677 (“[T]he delegating firms appear to control no one.  In 
reality, however, engaging businesses often retain far more control than initial appear-
ances might suggest.”). 
 169. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 170. Mark Harris, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Workers Protest: ‘I Am a Human 
Being, Not an Algorithm’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014, 9:41), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/technology/2014/dec/03/amazon-mechanical-turk-workers-protest-jeff-be-
zos; see Gershon & Cefkin, supra note 6, at 20 (“One risk to workers in contest and 
micro-task labor sites is that people will perform work, but their work is rejected.  There 
may be little or no explanation as to why nor a means of disputing these decisions.”); 
De Stefano, supra note 31, at 492. 
 171. Harris, supra note 170. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See De Stefano, supra note 31, at 483 (“[W]hen they do show up for work they 
are usually bound to follow rules and guidelines set out by platforms and apps and, in 
some cases, also to accept a certain percentage of jobs coming through the app.”). 






   (Gig firm)    (Workers) 
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B.  False Avoidance 
Central to work distribution platforms’ operation as avoidance hacks is 
their ability to exploit the legal distinction between employees and non-em-
ployees – most commonly, independent contractors.  Employment law contains 
a variety of tests for assessing employee status, some of which are statutory 
and some from common law.175  These tests are typically variations of the “eco-
nomic realities” test and the “control test,” which both consider the “nature and 
degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the manner in which the work is 
to be performed.”176 
When a worker believes that a company has misclassified him or her as 
an independent contractor, the worker may challenge this classification in 
court.177  A judge then decides whether the worker, despite his or her independ-
ent contractor label, should actually be considered an employee under the law.  
Those workers deemed employees may then make claims for unpaid wages, 
antidiscrimination protections, family and medical leave rights, compensation 
for occupational illnesses and injuries, and all other rights that are contingent 
on employee status.178 
The legal tests used in these classification disputes do not explicitly re-
quire human managers to exercise control over workers, but the version of 
“control” embedded in the tests seems to assume that control is exercised 
through oversight by a person.179  Gig firms, by contrast, exercise control by 
algorithm.  The algorithm implements a series of rules built into the software 
program, which, as explained above, take into account customer ratings and 
preferences.180  This creates a challenge for the law.  When a gig company 
designs an algorithm, and then puts it into practice, essentially to run on auto-
pilot, is the company still in control?  Likewise, when a firm outsources gran-
ular management and assessment tasks to customers, can it still be considered 
an employer? 
As one of us has explored in prior work, the answers to these questions 
vary considerably.181  In terms of the risk of independent contractor misclassi-
fication, some gig firms are functionally indistinguishable from traditional 
brick and mortar companies, exercising substantial control over their workers, 
though continuing to label them as independent contractors.182 
 
 175. Alexander, supra note 160, at 939 (explaining tests). 
 176. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th Cir. 1987); accord 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992). 
 177. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 178. See id. at 1073–74. 
 179. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 8, at 361–62. 
 180. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 583 (“Control may be 
high, given that companies like Uber use customer ratings to maintain almost a constant 
surveillance over workers, with consumers deputized to manage the workforce.”). 
 181. See generally Alexander, supra note 160. 
 182. See id. at 954–55. 
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In fact, the very software that enables firms to disclaim control might also 
be the mechanism by which control is exerted.  For example, as David Weil, 
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division Administrator under 
President Obama, has observed, software becomes essential as “lead compa-
nies” replace employees with various forms of non-employee labor but attempt 
to guarantee the consistency and quality of the services provided – to ensure 
the integrity of the brand.  According to Weil: 
It is not coincidental . . . that the expansion of the fissured workplace 
[Weil’s term for the growth in independent and sub-contracting and 
franchise structures] has been accompanied by the creation of many 
forms for standard setting and monitoring, among them the promulga-
tion of bar codes, electronic data interchange protocols, product identi-
fication, shipment and delivery standards, GPS, and other methods of 
tracking products through supply chains and monitoring provision of 
service to customers.183 
Thus, some gig firms engage in false avoidance.184  It is yet to be seen 
how quickly courts will adapt to hidden forms of control exercised through 
software.  Litigation involving Uber and Lyft, another ride-sharing company, 
suggest that courts are at least receptive to arguments to that effect.  Courts in 
both cases examined how those companies used star ratings and ride-refusal 
rates to discipline and ultimately terminate drivers from the service.185  Their 
analysis, however, was substantially aided by a clear paper trail describing the 
operation of the software.186  Uber warned drivers in its handbook about the 
importance of accepting proffered rides requests.187  Lyft was more circum-
spect about its “driver deactivation” practices but provided sufficient discovery 
on that point to support the court’s analysis.188 
 
 183. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR 
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 12 (2014). 
 184. As Orly Lobel puts it, “Are companies like Uber . . . digital clearinghouses 
connecting independent drivers-for-hire with customers, or rather are they employers 
violating wage-and-hour [and other employment] laws?”  Lobel, supra note 31, at 91. 
 185. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
      186.  See Elizabeth Tippett, Employee Classification in the Sharing Economy, 
in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND REGULATION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
(forthcoming 2018).  
 187. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149. 
 188. In a deposition, one witness admitted that “Lyft also tracks each driver’s can-
cellations, and may terminate a driver for high cancellation rates.”  Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 
3d at 1071.  Communications with drivers explained that an acceptance rate above 
ninety percent was “excellent,” while seventy-five percent “needs improvement.”  Id.  
It apparently did not disclose the exact threshold at which they would be cut off, instead 
advising that an acceptance rate “well below the community standard” will trigger a 
warning and that three warnings would lead to being deactivated.  Id. 
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C.  True Avoidance 
Others firms, however, seem to fall squarely outside traditional defini-
tions of the employer-employee relationship.189  In this regard – as other schol-
ars have argued – certain “gig economy” work relationships legitimately reside 
beyond the reach of existing legal rules.190  Mechanical Turk may be one such 
firm, in that it has ceded control over workers completely to customers, who 
have the ability unilaterally to hire and fire (i.e., refuse to pay) Turkers, with 
limited to no oversight from the gig firm itself.191  These companies’ “true” 
avoidance hacks give them a stable competitive advantage over their rivals.  
However, like scheduling software, these avoidance strategies can cause harms 
to gig workers beyond their loss of employee status; change the norms around 
fair wages and working conditions, even for employees; and weaken the system 
of employment law, writ large.192 
First, the harm to workers stems from software’s transmission of cus-
tomer feedback and control directly to workers.  As algorithms translate cus-
tomer feedback into management, they often do so in ways that are opaque to 
workers.  A gig worker may have an inferential sense for the constraints im-
posed by the software, for example, but is unlikely to know its exact specifica-
tion.193  Indeed, these specifications are not fixed – the company might change 
the algorithm overnight, and the change would be undetectable to workers, ex-
cept by inference, or perhaps through a generic notice of a software update.  
Returning to Gershon and Cefkin: 
 
 189. Matthew Finkin offers a historical comparison to the practice of “outwork” – 
giving projects to others to complete at their home or work site.  “As with the putting-
out of wool work five centuries ago, an employer concerned only with the price and 
quality of the product turned in need not expend time and money in the supervision of 
the work process.”  Finkin, supra note 39, at 609. 
 190. Tippett, supra note 31, at 576–77 (noting that some gig companies are essen-
tially “listing” companies and exercise similar (minimal) levels of control to Craigslist 
or LinkedIn). 
 191. See Harris, supra note 170. 
 192. One survey of crowdworkers found that a chief complaint was low pay com-
bined with an insufficient quantity of work.  Berg, supra note 31, at 557.  This is quite 
similar to the income instability described in our discussion of scheduling software in 
Part IV.B, above.  On the other hand, crowdworkers and gig companies are not mono-
lithic in this regard.  Berg’s study of crowdworkers found that a majority had other jobs, 
with thirty-seven percent reporting that their gig job was their primary source of in-
come.  Id. at 554–55.  Likewise, a study of Uber drivers found that they received a 
higher hourly rate of pay than taxi drivers, “even after accounting for their expenses.”  
Lobel, supra note 31, at 131 (citing study by economist Alan Krueger); see also Cherry, 
A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, supra note 30, at 961 (“The concern about virtual work 
is that it will lead to further acceleration of the race to the bottom and ultimately the 
further erosion of workers’ rights and benefits.”). 
 193. See James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 
1723 (2005). 
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[W]orkers are still being controlled and disciplined [when performing 
gig work], but because this occurs through technological platforms that 
re-allocate and often obfuscate where the source of control might be 
located, workers have trouble determining who is responsible for what, 
and thus need to develop new analyses and strategies when they want 
to change the working conditions or payment system enabled by these 
platforms.194 
Moreover, where the entirety of the relationship between the worker, the 
customer, and the gig firm is mediated by software, research suggests that the 
worker is likely to be treated harshly.195  A customer – especially one that has 
never met the worker performing a task halfway across the internet – may as-
sign a negative rating or withhold payment upon the slightest provocation.196  
Due to the opacity of the algorithms that run the work distribution software, 
workers are left struggling to identify the source of their negative treatment and 
to adapt accordingly. 
Second, true avoidance hacks may change the norms around fair treat-
ment of workers across all types of employment relationships.  For example, 
workers who provide services via the Mechanical Turk platform commonly 
receive sub-minimum wages for their labor.197  Like workers’ “loss” of over-
time pay when they are sent home after forty hours of work, this “loss” cannot 
be considered a compensable harm to the Turkers, as it is a result of the bargain 
inherent in legislative line-drawing.  When the entitlement to a minimum wage 
is contingent on employee status, it follows that non-employees can permissi-
bly receive less than the minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, the labor market is porous, and labor practices that grow up 
outside the walls of the employer-employee relationship can influence norms 
and practices within.  Rock-bottom wages paid to Turkers may drive down 
wages for employees who do similar, routine tasks.  Turkers’ “sustained sense 
 
 194. Gershon & Cefkin, supra note 6, at 23. 
 195. See Berg, supra note 31, at 562 (“A main complaint of crowdworkers is mis-
treatment by requesters . . . . Of the crowdworkers surveyed, 94% have had work re-
jected or were refused payment.”). 
 196. De Stefano, supra note 31, at 478 (“[Workers] could be expected to run as 
flawlessly and smoothly as a software or technological tool and then, if something goes 
amiss, they might receive worse reviews . . . . This, in turn, might have severe implica-
tions on their ability to work or earn in the future . . . .”). 
 197. Utpal Dholakia, My Experience as an Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
Worker, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 21, 2015), https://www.psychologyto-
day.com/blog/the-science-behind-behavior/201507/my-experience-amazon-mechani-
cal-turk-mturk-worker (reporting earning “somewhere between $3 and $3.25 per hour 
of work” (bold omitted)); see also Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, supra note 30, 
at 994 (identifying minimum wage and FLSA issues in virtual work). 
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of powerless,” as one described it, embodied by the fact that they work com-
pletely at the mercy of customers,198 might also seep into the employer-em-
ployee relationship, as traditional employers feel less inclined to create “good 
jobs,” where the alternative is cheap, powerless labor obtained via software.199 
Third, avoidance hacks, if sufficiently widespread, undermine employ-
ment law by removing workers from its ambit.  As sociologist Doreen McBar-
net notes, a set of laws without subjects upon which to operate becomes fun-
damentally ineffective: “The law is not broken but it is, nonetheless, entirely 
ineffective in achieving its aims.  Despite the legislature, despite the enforcers, 
law becomes merely symbolic.”200  Particularly for workers with already tenu-
ous ties to the labor force, legal avoidance at the margins feels a lot like no 
protection at all.  For these marginal workers, employment law becomes ossi-
fied, a term that Cynthia Estlund has used to describe the lack of adaptation 
and renewal in American labor law.201  Estlund states: 
The labor laws have failed to deliver an effective mechanism of work-
place representation, and have become nearly irrelevant, to the vast ma-
jority of private sector American workers. . . .  
 . . . .  
. . . The core of American labor law has been essentially sealed off 
– to a remarkably complete extent and for a remarkably long time – both 
from democratic revision and renewal and from local experimentation 
and innovation.202 
If avoidance hacks become sufficiently widespread, then this description 
may apply equally to employment law.  Firms will continue to use software to 
 
 198. Dholakia, supra note 197. 
 199. Compare, e.g., ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF 
POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S TO 
2000S 10 (2011) (defining what it is to have a “good job,” as opposed to a “bad job,” 
characterized by “low wages, few benefits, and virtually no long-term security”), with 
Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra note 30, at 601 (“In many ways then, 
crowdsourcing is a return to industrial (or even pre-industrial in terms of its pay by the 
piece and work at home) systems.  Crowdwork features highly rigid control systems 
and deskilled work.”). 
 200. McBarnet, supra note 19, at 118.  Similarly, on the implications of widespread 
noncompliance, Tim Wu quotes theorist John Perry Barlow: “No law can be success-
fully imposed on a huge population that does not morally support it and possesses easy 
means for its invisible evasion.”  Wu, supra note 13, at 751 (quoting John Perry Barlow, 
The Next Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2000), 
https://www.wired.com/2000/10/download/). 
 201. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527, 1530 (2002). 
 202. Id. at 1528–30. 
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innovate – lawfully and at scale – in spaces that employment law does not 
reach, and the law will begin to lose its relevance to the modern worker. 
VII.  REGULATORY RESPONSES 
As the four case studies show, both noncompliance and avoidance hacks 
can threaten employment law.  They also harm workers, and tend to do so cu-
mulatively, affecting the employees with the most marginal attachment to the 
workplace, and those with the weakest bargaining power.203  Hourly workers 
who manage to pass the selection algorithms and secure a job find their wages 
shaved by rounding and automatic break deductions, their hours reduced by 
scheduling software, and their free time eroded by uncompensated “on call” 
status.  Those unable to find traditional employment may instead opt for work 
in the gig economy, where they lack any such protections, however poorly en-
forced.  In other words, software’s costs fall upon the workers least able to bear 
them. 
The question thus becomes: What sorts of regulatory responses might 
limit harms to these workers, without triggering further regulatory hacks?204  
We offer four possible approaches.  The first is to treat software rules as em-
ployer rules, requiring employers to disclose the rules’ use and operation to 
employees.  A second approach might be focused on harm reduction.  A third 
would be to punish employers for intentional avoidance.  The fourth approach 
would remove the legal classifications that enable avoidance. 
A.  Treat Software Rules as Employer Rules 
Broadly speaking, regulators and courts could mitigate software’s corro-
sive effect on legal rules by recognizing software for what it is: a means of 
implementing employer requirements and metrics.  An employer’s rounding 
rules and automatic break deductions are no different from employer policies 
implemented by hand, and their fairness should be evaluated as such.  Like-
wise, an algorithm that screens out certain applicants qualifies as an employee 
selection procedure.  This provides a more concrete frame through which to 
view employer decision-making. 
 
 203. Highly compensated employees have thus far been largely insulated from the 
constraining effects of software, as they offer “intangible” skills that seemingly demand 
in-person interviews and individual consideration.  They are paid the same salary re-
gardless of hours worked.  Though technology makes them perpetually “on call” in a 
different way, it generally does not require them to drop what they are doing and return 
to the office. 
 204. Returning to Wu’s typology, then, noncompliance and avoidance have the po-
tential to change legal rules in the favor of regulated entities – here, the employers who 
chafe at the obligations and compliance costs imposed by employment law.  See gen-
erally Wu, supra note 13.  Instead of investing in direct change efforts like lobbying, 
employers who read Barlow and McBarnet might invest in ever better software to 
achieve more effective noncompliance and avoidance. 
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Where employers have highly accurate records of an employee’s actual 
time punched, should they be allowed to adopt a policy to make that time less 
accurate through rounding?  Should employers be allowed to deduct breaks 
automatically from employee pay, when the deductions are in fact erroneous?  
These are clear policy questions that tend to be obscured when the issues are 
cast as technological matters or software configurations.  Indeed, courts some-
times decline to assess employer policies in a rigorous way because the policies 
were enacted via software – as though the software’s technological status pro-
vided an additional layer of legitimacy.205 
The same is true for software that serves a managerial function.  When an 
employer adopts software that constrains employees – whether by cutting them 
off if they receive certain customer ratings or assigning them inferior work 
tasks – it is equivalent to an employer policy enforced by a manager.  (This 
actually represents greater control because software operates as a manager that 
enforces the policy 100% of the time.)  As the types of software we describe 
become more ubiquitous and familiar, courts and regulators will likely become 
savvier in this regard, just as they became more sophisticated in their handling 
of legal issues related to the internet, email, and e-discovery over time. 
Second, employers should also be presumed to know the likely effects of 
policies implemented through software – both from a substantive standpoint 
and an informational one.  Employers know that their software rules apply at 
the aggregate level, and they implement them with those aggregate effects in 
mind.  Especially for software rules that place employers at a statistical ad-
vantage, there is little uncertainty about the rules’ effects at the time they are 
implemented.  Additionally, employers always have the luxury of measuring 
the effects of their policies, should they so choose.  Indeed, software’s data 
mining and predictive functions provide employers with an unprecedented op-
portunity to gather information about the impact of their software-implemented 
policies and procedures.  Consequently, using software settings that round em-
ployee time, deduct unpaid breaks, and otherwise harm employees is no differ-
ent from other wage and hour violations that are routinely declared willful, 
such as misclassifying employees as exempt from overtime or as independent 
contractors.  Courts should presume employers know what they are doing when 
they implement software, and to the extent they do not, the threat of additional 
penalties provides added incentive to do so with greater care. 
The same is true of selection and performance algorithms.  When employ-
ers choose to implement complex selection algorithms, they should be pre-
sumed to know what is in those algorithms and how they work.  The underlying 
purpose of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,206 as 
 
 205. See, e.g., Corbin v. Time Warner Entm’t–Advance/Newhouse P’ship, 821 
F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016) (ignoring expert conclusions that rounding policy 
shaved more overtime minutes than regular minutes and seemingly deferring to the 
technology: “TWEAN’s system is mechanical and does not depend on managerial over-
sight – indeed, all time punches are controlled by the Avaya/Kronos timekeeping sys-
tem and are fully walled off from supervisory editing”). 
 206. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1–1607.16 (2017). 
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well as disparate impact case law,207 was to place a duty of care on the em-
ployer to know what the algorithm was testing.  Previously, employers exer-
cised considerable care on the theoretical side but insufficient care with regard 
to the data.  In the current context, data-based models should be no defense for 
algorithms that are poorly understood and that replicate existing inequalities.208  
As the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. articulated, Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) seeks to eliminate the “built-in 
headwinds” that operate as barriers to employment.209  If the employer’s mod-
els heedlessly reconstruct those headwinds, Title VII protections should not 
yield. 
Likewise, employers should be presumed to know the effects of software 
on the quality of their data.  Automatic break deductions are problematic be-
cause employees no longer record their actual break time.  Courts often refuse 
to certify such claims as a class or collective action because each missed break 
would need to be assessed on an individualized basis.210  Likewise, when em-
ployers adopt software rules and policies that obscure the amount of time 
worked – like “grace periods” – they should be presumed to know the effect 
on the quality of their records. 
Lastly, treating software rules as employer rules requires employers to 
disclose them.  Employers tend to disclose their formal workplace policies in 
lengthy employee handbooks.  They should do the same for their software 
rules.211  Some of them already do – for example, some employer time and 
attendance policies available online describe the rounding and automatic break 
deduction rules applicable to employees.  Employers should be required to 
make this information available to all affected employees, along with the time 
and attendance data produced by the timekeeping system.  Likewise, selection 
and performance algorithms should be made available to employees upon re-
quest, just as some states give employees the right to request their personnel 
file.212  This is not currently the case – in one lawsuit, the plaintiff was not even 
able to get a copy of the algorithm during discovery, and then the case was 
dismissed for the plaintiff’s failure to identify the component of the selection 
mechanism that produced the disparate impact.213 
  
 
 207. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975). 
 208. Purchasing an unknown algorithm from a third party that claims it to be a trade 
secret should not be a defense to the discriminatory, adverse impact that the algorithm 
produces. 
 209. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
 210. See Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10–cv–960–ST, 2013 WL 1326563, 
at *24–25 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2013). 
 211. See Tippett, Alexander & Eigen, supra note 47, at 56. 
 212. Cf. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West 2017). 
 213. Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304–05 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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B.  Reduce Harm 
The previous section focused primarily on improving the enforcement of 
legal rules against noncomplying employers.  This section turns to avoidance.  
As discussed in the previous Parts, true avoidance hacks present problems be-
cause they cause harms to workers that are beyond the set of “acceptable” 
losses that arise when a worker is ineligible for a right or protection.  In this 
view, an employer’s lawful use of software to situate workers beyond the reach 
of employment law is not the problem; the problem is the extra or unexpected 
harm that results.214  Indeed, some commentators worry that clamping down 
on software’s use in the workplace will “stymie” good and beneficial innova-
tion, i.e., will throw the metaphorical baby out with the bathwater.215  A harm 
reduction approach to employers’ software-aided avoidance tactics does not 
penalize the avoidance hack itself or change the legal line-drawing that enables 
the avoidance in the first place but rather blunts some of the harms that workers 
experience. 
For example, responding to the software-enabled rise in scheduling insta-
bility for hourly workers, some localities have experimented with fair schedul-
ing laws that require employers to give employees advance notice of schedule 
changes, compensate employees for on-call hours during which they are not 
called in, and offer additional hours first to existing part-time employees before 
hiring new workers.216  A similar bill has been introduced in the U.S. Senate.217  
Likewise, gig firms might be required to lessen the harm caused to workers by 
seemingly unreasonable customer ratings, in the case of Uber, or refusal to pay, 
in the case of Mechanical Turk. 
These strategies do not penalize employers directly for engaging in sched-
ule “optimization” or mining customer ratings for management purposes but 
instead focus on reducing the harm caused to workers.  Of course, the more 
onerous these practices become for an employer, the less likely the employer 
 
 214. Brishen Rogers offers a useful frame for thinking about this problem.  He ar-
gues that judgments about whether a particular worker qualifies as an employee rarely 
involve “mechanically determining issues of fact.  Rather, such courts inevitably make 
substantive judgments regarding the fairness of imposing employment duties in partic-
ular instances.  In this regard, employment is like the concept of duty in tort.”  Rogers, 
supra note 31, at 482–83. 
 215. Lobel, supra note 31, at 137 (“[R]egulators should prefer solutions that di-
rectly address any negative consequences that people or society may experience from 
the rise of the platform, rather than blanket prohibitive solutions that stymie its devel-
opment.”). 
 216. See, e.g., Formula Retail Employee Rights Ordinances, CITY & COUNTY S.F. 
http://sfgov.org/olse/formula-retail-employee-rights-ordinances (last visited Dec. 20, 
2017). 
 217. See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren, DeLauro, Murray, Scott, Mur-
phy Introduce Schedules That Work Act to End Unstable Scheduling Practices (July 
15, 2015), https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=896. 
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will be to engage in them.  In this sense, harm reduction can function as a pen-
alty, albeit indirectly. 
Other harm-reduction responses to avoidance hacks are enacted via the 
tax system or by coalitions of businesses and worker advocacy groups, rather 
than via obligations placed on individual employers.218  The Earned Income 
Tax Credit, for example, might help cushion some of the income volatility ex-
perienced by workers subject to last minute scheduling changes.219 
However, harm reduction strategies such as these do little directly to stop 
the underlying practices that originally generated the harm: the avoidance 
hacks that are enacted via scheduling software and/or work distribution plat-
forms.  In fact, blunting the harms that workers experience might have the un-
intended consequence of normalizing employers’ avoidance strategies because 
those strategies would then cause “only” the losses that are already anticipated 
by the law: the “loss” of overtime for workers below forty hours or the “loss” 
of ACA-guaranteed health insurance for workers below thirty.220  Yet if firms’ 
avoidance hacks, taken together, relegate enough workers to employment law-
free spaces, then the existence of lower labor standards outside the employer-
employee relationship may have a detrimental impact on wages and working 
conditions for employees as well.  Moreover, to quote McBarnet once more, 
employment law as a whole suffers as it is avoided repeatedly and rendered 
“merely symbolic.”221 
Addressing these losses would require a different set of responses: those 
that penalize employers’ avoidance hacks directly, and/or those that remove 
the classifications within the law that allow employers to engage in arbitrage 
and avoidance in the first place.  The following sections take on these regula-
tory responses in turn. 
C.  Punish Intentional Avoidance 
An alternative, or complementary, approach to avoidance hacks is to pe-
nalize employers’ intentional acts of avoidance.222  This approach can apply 
equally to “true” avoidance hacks, where employers use software lawfully to 
 
 218. See Rogers, supra note 31, at 516–17. 
 219. Rogers argues for revisiting “our system of employment-linked benefits,” for 
deterring job creation and further fueling avoidance practices.  Id. at 517. 
 220. Marc Andreessen and others have argued that the gig economy is made possi-
ble by the ACA because it enables workers to obtain health care without an employer.  
Evan McMorris-Santoro & Johana Bhuiyan, How Obamacare Drives the Sharing 
Economy, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 14 2014, 5:20 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/how-obamacare-drives-the-sharing-econ-
omy?utm_term=.tnVm10NBr#.hcZY8ydgA (quoting Andreessen); Diane Mulcahy, 
Repealing Obamacare Would Be Bad News for the Gig Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/repealing-obamacare-would-be-bad-news-for-
the-gig-economy. 
 221. McBarnet, supra note 19, at 114. 
 222. See KATZ, supra note 21, at 11–13. 
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avoid compliance costs (e.g., scheduling software), or “false” avoidance hacks, 
where employers use software in an attempt to avoid the employer-employee 
relationship but retain too much actual control to be successful (e.g., the mis-
classifications allegations against Uber).  Either way, employers dodge the re-
quirements of employment law, and that dodge could be the target of a new 
regulatory response. 
Some models for this approach already exist.  First, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (“ERISA”) prohibits some of employers’ attempts 
to navigate around the ACA’s thirty-hour threshold.  Under Section 510 of the 
statute, an employer may not  
 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a par-
ticipant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he [or she] is 
entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . .  or for the 
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such 
participant may become entitled under the plan.223   
 
Commentators interpret this provision as stopping employers from changing 
an employee’s status in order to avoid a benefits requirement.224  In other 
words, ERISA would protect “full-time employees whose hours are reduced to 
part-time status (or fired outright) with the specific intent to deny benefits un-
der the employer’s group health plan.”225 
This is precisely the allegation being made by a class of formerly full-
time employees of Dave & Buster’s, whose hours were reduced to part-time 
post-ACA.226  At the time of this writing, the employees’ lawsuit has survived 
a motion to dismiss; whether their claims survive on the merits remain to be 
seen.227  Further, it is unclear whether Section 510 extends to part-time em-
ployees who are kept in part-time status, rather than being shifted from full- to 
part-time, in order to avoid the ACA.228  It is this latter scenario in which sched-
uling software is likely the most useful to employers as an avoidance hack – 
 
 223. Teumer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 1140 (2012)). 
 224. See Colleen E. Medill, Comparing ERISA and Fair Labor Standards Act 
Claims Under the Affordable Care Act, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 173, 182–83 
(2016). 
 225. Id. at 189. 
 226. Marin v. Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 460, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 227. See id. at 463. 
 228. Medill, supra note 224, at 189 (“It is less clear, however, whether section 510 
is violated when an employer refuses to hire a full-time employee, or refuses to promote 
a part-time employee to full-time status, with the specific intent to deny such an em-
ployee benefits under the employer’s group health plan.  Prior to the enactment of the 
ACA some federal courts refused to recognize ‘failure to hire’ claims under section 
510, creating a split among the circuit courts of appeals.  The federal courts have yet to 
address these questions in the context of ACA-related claims, making the issue ripe for 
Supreme Court review and resolution.” (footnote omitted)). 
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preventing, as OnShift promises, “part-time workers [from] . . . slipping into 
full-time status.”229 
Second, some jurisdictions are experimenting with directly penalizing the 
act of misclassification.230  Under federal employment law as currently written, 
employers only experience indirect misclassification penalties.231  In other 
words, when a misclassified independent contractor successfully argues for 
employee status in court, he or she then receives the opportunity to make a 
wage and hour, discrimination, or other claim (which may or may not itself be 
successful).  The employer, of course, pays in the form of attorneys’ fees and 
other resources devoted to litigation.  But the employer is not forced to pay any 
penalty for the act of misclassification, in and of itself.  David Weil describes 
state laws, as well as proposed federal legislation, that sanction employers di-
rectly for the act of misclassification.232  These represent penalties for employ-
ers’ false avoidance hacks. 
The examples of ERISA’s ACA avoidance sanction and some state laws’ 
misclassification sanctions are different in important ways, however.  The 
ERISA sanction targets “true avoidance,” i.e., successfully implemented 
avoidance.  In scheduling optimization scenarios, there is generally no dispute 
over the number of hours that an employee worked; the facts support the claim 
to legal avoidance.  As a result, ERISA uses employer intent as the dividing 
line to determine which acts of true avoidance are permissible and which are 
prohibited.233  Intent inquiries in employment law are notoriously thorny, how-
ever, and so a proposal that ERISA-style avoidance penalties be applied 
broadly is not a simple one. 
In the misclassification example, by contrast, the underlying avoidance 
hack is a “false” one, meaning that the facts do not support the employer’s 
claim to have avoided the requirements of employment law.  Penalizing the 
employer for faking avoidance – based on a variety of types of evidence con-
cerning the reality of the work relationship – is an easier task than requiring a 
messy and difficult intent inquiry. 
D.  Remove Classifications That Enable Avoidance 
A final possible regulatory response to avoidance hacks, both true and 
false, is the removal of the classifications and eligibility parameters within the 
law that enable avoidance in the first place.  Indeed, “[i]f . . . employment laws 
did not exclusively protect employees, the thinking goes, then employers 
would have no incentive to manipulate their employees’ classification to avoid 
 
 229. Moran, supra note 140. 
 230. See WEIL, supra note 183, at 204–05. 
 231. What Is “Misclassification”?, U.S. DEP’T. LAB., https://www.dol.gov/fea-
tured/misclassification/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
 232. WEIL, supra note 183, at 205. 
 233. See generally Medill, supra note 224 (providing background on ERISA). 
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the laws’ coverage.”234  Pennsylvania state law does this already, protecting 
independent contractors alongside employees from job discrimination.235  Sim-
ilarly, the ACA could be rewritten to remove or change the thirty-hour thresh-
old.236  As one of us has summarized elsewhere: 
Both of these solutions would close off an avenue for employers’ legal 
avoidance by removing the distinctions within the law that employers 
can exploit[.]  In doing so, the legal inquiry could refocus on the merits 
of the parties’ arguments – whether an employer actually engaged in 
unlawful discrimination, for example, or whether an employer supplied 
the required benefits – instead of on the threshold question of a worker’s 
proper classification as an employee or independent contractor or full- 
or part-time worker.237 
Thus, a firm using software to operate in noncompliance with employ-
ment law would be unable to claim the “cover” of the avoidance label, as there 
would be no threshold within the law that would enable this sort of avoidance 
and arbitrage tactic. 
Lu-in Wang has proposed something similar in an article that examines 
the way that work distribution platforms like Uber’s “giv[e] customers oppor-
tunities to discriminate against service workers.”238  There, Wang suggests that 
“employment discrimination law needs a model of employer liability to reach 
discrimination that originates beyond the employer-employee dyad, in recogni-
tion of both the triangular structure of, and the power of the customer in, inter-
active service work.”239  Orly Lobel makes a similar point: “Contemporary re-
alities may necessitate extending protections we find valuable as a society – 
 
 234. Alexander, supra note 19, at 324 (citing Marc Linder, Dependent and Inde-
pendent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in 
Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187 (1999); Lewis 
L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for Amending 
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 
B.C. L. REV. 239 (1997)). 
 235. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 955(a) (West 2017). 
 236. Alexander, supra note 19, at 324 (“Likewise, advocates have proposed elimi-
nating, or at least changing, the work-hour thresholds contained in employer mandates 
like the Affordable Care Act for the very reason that such cutoffs encourage employer 
work-arounds. . . . In introducing an amendment to the ACA in January 2015, for ex-
ample, Senator Susan Collins of Maine argued that the current work-hour threshold 
‘creates a perverse incentive for businesses to cut their employees’ hours so they are no 
longer considered full time.”). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Lu-in Wang, When the Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination as Cus-
tomer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 253 (2016). 
 239. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). 
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dignity and anti-discrimination principles, whistleblowing protections, insur-
ance and portable benefits, and occupational health and safety – to all laborers 
regardless of their employment status.”240 
Apart from changes in the law’s classification structure, labor conditions 
for workers who are subject to avoidance hacks might be changed as a matter 
of fact.  And if wages and working conditions outside the traditional employ-
ment relationship begin to rival those within, then avoidance hacks begin to 
lose some of their luster.  For example, some Turkers have formed an advocacy 
group to pressure Amazon to establish a minimum wage for work performed 
via the company’s platform.241  If such efforts are successful, then they would 
begin to functionally erase the distinction between those whose employment 
law rights are being avoided and those whose are being honored. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has identified ways in which software can operate as a “reg-
ulatory hack,” through noncompliance and avoidance.  It has examined four 
case studies of software programs used to accomplish such hacks: timekeeping 
software, screening and scheduling algorithms, scheduling software, and work 
distribution platforms used by firms in the gig economy.  These and other types 
of software242 increasingly mediate, manage, and monitor the work relation-
ship, creating new harms for workers and eroding employment law itself.  We 








 240. Lobel, supra note 31, at 136. 
 241. There is currently no such minimum.  Amazon Mechanical Turk Pricing, 
AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://requester.mturk.com/pricing (last visited Dec. 20, 
2017) (“You decide how much to pay Workers for each assignment.”). 
 242. There are other examples – not covered here – of software that is used to mon-
itor and manage the work relationship.  One is the handset system used to monitor 
warehouse workers’ time spent engaging in productive activity, in transit, and in idle-
ness.  See, e.g., Carole Cadwalldr, I Spent a Week Working at an Amazon Warehouse 
and It Is Hard, Physical Work, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 1, 2013, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/i-spent-a-week-working-at-an-amazon-warehouse-
and-it-is-hard-physical-work-2013-12 (discussing workers’ being “monitored by an 
Orwellian handset every second of every shift”).  Another example is the wearable 
health monitoring device used by employers to encourage employees to engage in phys-
ical activity and to achieve other wellness goals, thereby – in theory – reducing absen-
teeism, improving productivity, and lowering employers’ health insurance costs.  See 
e.g., Elizabeth A. Brown, The Fitbit Fault Line: Two Proposals to Protect Health and 
Fitness Data at Work, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1 (2016). 
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